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INTRODUCTION

The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause lies at the intersection of private ownership and the government's power to regulate. Deciding when a
government action requires compensation has therefore become a familiar
property rights battleground. Advocates for stronger private property pro* Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law. Thanks to Michael
Heller for his tireless encouragement and advice, and comments throughout the process.
Thanks also to Vicki Been, Michael Cahill, Hanoch Dagan, Barry Friedman, Clayton Gillette, Abner Greene, James Krier, Thomas Lee, Daryl Levinson, the Hon. J. Garvan Murtha,
Benjamin Means, and Nelson Tebbe for their input and comments, as well as to Peggy Davis
and the members of NYU's Lawyering faculty who workshopped the piece. Keil Mueller
and Ivy Hernandez provided research assistance.
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tection argue for compensating more often than their counterparts on the
opposite side of the debate. Surprisingly, this familiar disagreement ignores
what should be a central issue in takings analysis: when compensation is
due, how much should the government have to pay? Valuing just compensation turns out to be largely unstudied but essential for defining the extent
of constitutional protection for private property.
The valuation problem has been hidden behind a veil of apparent consensus.' For all the disagreement and uncertainty in the rest of takings jurisprudence, compensation is considered straightforward; it is measured by
the fair market value of the property taken. In the takings context, however,
fair market value hides a number of substantive decisions-what this Article dubs "valuation mechanisms"-that can have a significant impact on a
property owner's ultimate award. Moreover, different valuation mechanisms are more or less well suited to advancing the goals of particular private property regimes. By failing to appreciate the range of decisions
contained within the fair market value standard, courts and commentators
risk internal inconsistency between their animating conceptions of the Takings Clause and their assessment of the value of government takings of private property. To take just one example, the strong private property
protection reflected in a per se takings rule can be undermined by a nominal
damages award.2
It is important to acknowledge up front that the fair market value standard itself is not without controversy as the benchmark for just compensation. Despite courts' admonition that just compensation should place an
owner in the position she would have occupied but for the governmental action, current compensation rules exclude whole categories of damages

I A few commentators have at least acknowledged the difficulty of valuing
takings claims. See

RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
182-86
(1985); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
POLITICS 325-68

(1995); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation for Takings: How Much Is Just?, 42 CATH.
U. L. REv. 72 1,
769 (1993); see also Douglas W. Kmiec, Regulatory Takings: The Supreme Court
Runs Out of Gas in
San Diego, 57 IND. L.J. 45, 80 (1982) ("Existing case law has evaded the value standard
to be applied.
Thus, time and again, opposing sides assume their natural positions without any consistent
guiding standard."); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of
"Just Compensation Law, " 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1216 (1967) ("Utilitarian algebra,
it appears, cannot
specify a sound compensation practice-the equation cannot be solved for that 'value'
of compensation
which yields a maximum excess of efficiency gains over demoralization or settlement
costs-until supposed facts about human psychology and behavior have been plugged into the equation
as independent
variables."). No one has provided a comprehensive treatment of the subject.
2 E.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (holding that
a
New York City regulation requiring building owners to permit a cable company to
run cable television
lines over their buildings was a taking because "a permanent physical occupation authorized
by government is a taking"). In the famous postscript to the case, the New York Court of
Appeals on remand
awarded $1 in damages. Loretto v. Group W. Cable, 522 N.Y.S.2d 543 (App. Div.
1987); see JESSE
DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1178 (3d ed. 1993); ROBERT
C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L.
BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 3-127 (2d ed. 2000).
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3
caused by government takings of private property. Fair market value excludes, for example, consequential damages and compensation for any of
4
the real but subjective harms suffered by the property owner. This contributes to the popular intuition that fair market value provides inadequate
compensation for takings.5
Given the connection between valuation and substantive takings theories, however, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that demands full
indemnification for all losses when the government takes private property.
Criticisms about the adequacy of compensation have too often elided the
difficult prior question, "adequate for what?" Because the content of the
Fifth Amendment's private property protection remains deeply contested,
the adequacy of compensation should depend on the purpose that compenindesation is meant to serve. In short, the compensation inquiry is not
property. 6
pendent of the constitutional protection afforded to private
This insight is a specific application of the rights-remedies scholarship
arguing that the content of a right is defined by the remedy for its violation.
Legal realists have long recognized that "[a] right is as big, precisely, as

3 E.g., Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) ("[The property owner] is entitled to be put
in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken.").
4 See Christopher Serkin, Valuing Interest: Net Harm and Fair Market Value in Brown v. Legal
Foundation of Washington, 37 IND. L. REv. 417, 425-26 (2004) (examining compensation rules); see
also EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 183; Laura H. Burney, Just Compensation and the Condemnation of Future Interests: EmpiricalEvidence of the Failureof FairMarket Value, 1989 BYU L. REV. 789, 793-94
(1989) (listing excluded categories of damages from fair market value, including "good will, lost profits,
and sentimental attachment").
5 Many leading commentators have argued that current compensation rules are inadequate to provide just compensation. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 53; Steve P. Calandrillo, Eminent Domain
Economics: Should "Just Compensation" Be Abolished, and Would "Takings Insurance" Work Instead?, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 451, 515 (2003); Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L.
REV. 741, 755 (1999) ("In some cases, fair market value may well measure the utility lost by the landowner due to the public action at hand. But this is not necessarily so, and, in fact, in many cases, it will
be otherwise."); Gideon Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How Just Is Just Compensation?, 48
NOTRE DAME LAW. 765, 778 (1973); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Takings, Efficiency, and Distributive Justice: A Response to ProfessorDagan, 99 MICH. L. REv. 157, 162 (2000); Michael H. Schill, Intergovernmental Takings and Just Compensation: A Question of Federalism, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 893
n.262 (1989); Ann E. Gergen, Comment, Why Fair Market Value Fails as Just Compensation, 14
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 181, 181 (1993); see also Michael DeBow, Unjust Compensation: The
Continuing Need for Reform, 46 S.C. L. REV. 579, 580 & nn.7-8 (1995) (citing additional sources);
Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 82-83 (1986) (discussing
just compensation standard in eminent domain).
6 Many courts fail to appreciate the interaction between these two questions. See, e.g., A.A. Profiles, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 253 F.3d 576 (11th Cir. 2001). The A.A. Profiles court had, in a
prior case, determined that a taking occurred and remanded to the district court. A.A. Profiles, Inc. v.
City of Fort Lauderdale, 859 F.2d 1483, 1489 (11 th Cir. 1988). On remand, the district court awarded
zero damages. A.A. Profiles, 253 F.3d at 581 (reciting procedural history). In a ruling suggesting how
easy it is to conflate the question of when a taking has occurred with the issue of damages, the Eleventh
Circuit held that the district court was not free "to revisit, in the guise of determining the proper damages, the issue of whether a taking occurred." Id. at 582.
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what the courts will do." 7 Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed's famous
article demonstrated the difference in the nature of entitlements protected
by liability as opposed to property rules-i.e., damages as opposed to injunctions.! Recently, Daryl Levinson has examined how the rightsremedies distinction breaks down throughout constitutional law.9 This Article takes the intuition one step further, arguing that the scope of liability
rule protection is determined by how courts actually value the right. 0
Recognizing this connection creates a number of important benefits.
First, it refutes the claim that fair market value is necessarily inadequate as
a measure of just compensation." Second, it reveals how compensation can
respond to and advance substantive takings goals. Finally, adding a compensation dimension to the traditional debate over when a taking has occurred opens up a broader range of options than current takings scholarship
recognizes. Takings theories traditionally presented a binary choice between compensation and no compensation. 2 This Article not only challenges the common understanding about how compensation is valued, it
also suggests more nuanced resolutions to cases that often seem to require a
broader range of options than paying "all" or paying "nothing."
The diversity of approaches to compensation may strike some as unjustifiably ad hoc, much like the rest of courts' takings inquiries. " But what if,
instead of fact-specific calculations that defy categorization, valuation deci7 KARL NICKERSON LLEWELLYN, THE
BRAMBLE BUSH 84 (1960).

Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
9 See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism
and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L.
REv. 857 (1999).
to Levinson has articulated the theory behind pricing
constitutional rights. As he succinctly writes,
"a right with less remedy is worth less and a right with more remedy is worth
more." Id. at 904. This
Article takes an important step forward from this broad theoretical point to examine how courts actually
expand and contract the price of takings.
I See supra note 5 (citing sources).
12 In Calabresi and Melamed's framework,
the choice appears to be between protecting property
owners with a liability rule, or simply assigning a property right to the government. See generally
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8. This Article largely leaves aside the possibility of protecting property owners with a property rule, enjoining the government's regulation altogether, because the government's power of eminent domain always preserves a mechanism for converting property rule protection
into market-based liability rule protection. The limits of this power are the subject of a case, Kelo
v.
City of New London, for which the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari. 843 A.2d 500 (Conn.
2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004).
13 One state court has recently noted the contingent-seeming
nature of valuation decisions:
Perhaps the best example of the chameleon-like form that damages can take is found in the Florida
Supreme Court's opinion in Polk. There, the court not only affirmed an award of damages for the
value of trees beyond the 125-foot zone, but also for the "prospective net revenues" the immature
trees would have produced if allowed to reach maturity. This is certainly illustrative of the varied
nature of damages found in inverse condemnation cases, which appears to be dictated by the particular facts of the case.
Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. City of Pompano Beach, 829 So. 2d 928, 931 (Fla. Dist.
Ct.
App. 2002) (citing Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Polk, 568 So. 2d 35, 43 (Fla. 1990)).
8

680
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sions respond to, and reflect, broader theoretical considerations? This Article argues that valuing compensation provides just such a window into
deeper theories of takings, revealing a host of considerations that map on to
specific approaches to takings law. 4 Moreover, compensation rules properly applied can advance the substantive goals of various takings regimes.
At the least, since the range of monetary values that can be assigned to takings claims corresponds to diverse social values, compensation rules should
be applied consistently with core constitutional values.
This Article therefore argues that the adequacy of compensation cannot
be determined in the abstract but must rather be judged by how effectively a
damages award advances the goals of the Takings Clause. Those goals are
themselves deeply contested, so instead of committing to any one, this Article examines the leading theories and the function of compensation within
each one. This first step is an important project in and of itself because the
relationship between the Takings Clause's protection for private property,
on the one hand, and compensation, on the other, is insufficiently understood. The Article goes on, however, to assess compensation under a variety of takings theories, arguing for the surprising conclusion that current
valuation methods are flexible enough to advance the goals of a variety of
those theories and are therefore not inadequate at all.
Part I identifies nine specific valuation mechanisms currently used to
measure compensation. Part II then examines various theories of the Takings Clause, developing a new taxonomy in the process that divides takings
theories by the approach to compensation that best advances their underlying goals. Part II ultimately matches these competing theories with the different valuation mechanisms identified in Part I. By examining why certain
valuation mechanisms are particularly well suited to the goals of specific
takings theories, Part 1I demonstrates that valuing takings claims is not a
process of arriving at a single "true" value of property, but is rather a deeply
context-dependent exercise. Part III finally puts the Article's theory about
valuation to the test, interpreting actual judicial pronouncements in a manner consistent with the Article's normative prescriptions. Part III demonstrates how courts can develop approaches to valuation that advance the
substantive goals of the Takings Clause.

14 For a similar approach to valuation in different contexts, see Michael Heller & Christopher

Serkin, Revaluing Restitution: From the Talmud to Postsocialism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1385, 1396 (1999)
(reviewing HANOCH DAGAN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT (1997)) (arguing that "[v]aluation of gain or harm,
often dismissed as a merely technical matter, reflects normative principles at the core of a national legal
ethos"); see generally DAGAN, supra.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

I.

THE FAIR MARKET VALUE STANDARD

A. The Compensation Problem
It is no secret that takings law is in a chronic state of disarray, and not
for a lack of attention. Courts, legal scholars, and economists have devoted
enormous effort to solving the vexing problem of identifying when a governmental action rises to the level of a taking. 5 Not surprisingly, a variety

of competing theories have emerged. Some commentators have argued for
strong judicial enforcement of the Takings Clause, suggesting that many, if
not most, governmental actions impacting private property are compensable
takings.'6 Others have argued the opposite extreme.' 7 Within these broad
camps, debate sometimes focuses on creating efficient incentives for the
government or for property owners,18 on fairness or distributive justice concerns, 19 on the nature of the property affected," and sometimes on broad and
contested political or economic theories." Despite, or perhaps because of,

the impressive body of work in this area, seemingly intractable problems

remain. Courts still struggle to identify when a regulation "goes too far," 2

coping unsatisfactorily with issues like the denominator problem, concep-

tual severance, the nuisance exception, temporary takings, and a host of
other thorny issues.
This Article's preliminary insight is that the same disagreements over
the amount of protection the Takings Clause should afford private property

are replayed in the compensation analysis. Stronger protection for private
property, for example, means not only finding more governmental actions
to be takings, but also awarding relatively higher compensation. The entire

15 The vast body of literature in the field is too broad to catalogue here. For a bibliography of
some
of the significant works in the area, see FISCHEL, supra note I, at 377-406.
16 Well-known representatives from this camp include,
for example, Justice Scalia, see Lucas v.
S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-19 (1992), and Richard Epstein, see EPSTEIN, supra note 1,
at 95, 107-20.
17Examples here include Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L.
REv. 1600, 1625-29
(1987), and Joseph L. Sax, Takings, PrivatePropertyandPublicRights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 151 (1971).
18 See, e.g., Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation
for Takings: An Economic
Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 580 (1984); Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REv. 997 (1999).
19 See, e.g., Dagan, supranote 5, at 767-70; William Michael
Treanor, The OriginalUnderstanding
of the Takings Clause and the PoliticalProcess, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782, 847 (1995) (suggesting the
Takings Clause was drafted with some redistributive concerns in mind).

20 See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADtN, REINTERPRETING
PROPERTY 146-65 (1993); Margaret Jane

Radin, Propertyand Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 965 (1982); Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy,
and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REv. 359, 387-90 (2000).
21 See, e.g., Robert Jerome Glennon, Taxation and Equal Protection,
58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 261,
276 n.81 (1990) (citing sources regarding political aspects of the takings debate); Michelman, supranote
1, at 1214-18 (proposing his famous utilitarian formula).
22See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)
("[I]f regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.").
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breadth of the traditional takings debate can also be found in courts' compensation analysis, but subtly-often almost invisibly.
The absence of scholarship in this area is perhaps not surprising. First,
there is no established canon of cases to study, as there is in the traditional
takings debate.23 Most valuation issues are resolved at trial or on remand,
and are therefore the stuff of district court and intermediate appellate court
opinions. Furthermore, the general valuation standard is well settled.
Courts all agree that takings are to be compensated by the fair market value
of the property taken.2 4 But a closer look at cases addressing how to measure fair market value reveals deep confusion and contradictory approaches.
In its typical formulation, "[t]he market value is usually considered to
be what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller. '25 There are a
number of ways to determine the fair market value of property, including
recent sales of the property itself, comparable sales, discounted cash flow,
and return on investments. 26 Despite a general agreement about these approaches, and even standardization in appraisal techniques, appraisers valuing the same property's fair market value can reach wildly different
results.27 Moreover, the nitty gritty decisions about what to include in permissible damage calculations transfers some of the most important valuation decisions from the hands of the appraiser-or, subsequently, the jury-

23 There is little disagreement about the most relevant cases. See generally The Supreme Court,
2001 Term-Leading Cases, 116 HARV. L. REv. 321 (2002) (citing Takings Clause cases).
24 E.g., United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 25 (1984); Ala. Power Co. v. FCC, 311
F.3d 1357, 1368 (1 1th Cir. 2002); Palm Beach Isle Assocs. v. United States, 231 F.3d 1354, 1363 (Fed.
Cir. 2000). This rule is subject to two narrow and seldom-applied exceptions. Fair market value does
not apply where it would be too difficult to measure or where manifest injustice would result. E.g.,
Kirby Forest Indus., Inc., v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 n.14 (1983) (citing United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950)).
25 Berenholz v. United States, I Cl. Ct. 620, 632 (1982) (citing United States v. Miller, 317 U.S.
369, 373-74(1942)).
26 United States v. Toronto Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396 (1949) (discussing
(1) original cost; (2) replacement cost; (3) past earnings; (4) insurance value; (5) scrap value; (6) book
value; (7) price at the nearest market-"place value"; and (8) highest foreign sale value, as possible
measures of recovery in the absence of an ascertainable fair market value); Snowbank Enters. Inc. v.
United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 476, 486 (1984) ("A trial court is not restricted to any of these methods in arriving at its determination of fair market value. Its valuation analysis may be based upon the comparable
sales, the replacement cost, the income capitalization or upon any combination of these three appraisal
methods."); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete Compensationfor Takings, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
110, 117 (2002) (identifying alternative means of assessing fair market value).
27 See, e.g., Bassett, LLC v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 63, 77-78 (2002) (comparing plaintiffs appraisal of property at $92,806,000 with defendant's appraisal at $34,600); see also Andrew W.
Schwartz, Reciprocity ofAdvantage: The Antidote to the Antidemocratic Trend in Regulatory Takings,
22 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 64-68 (2004) (describing the difficulty of valuing real property);
Keith Sharfman, Valuation Averaging: A New Procedurefor Resolving Valuation Disputes, 88 MINN.
L. REv. 357, 367 n.35 (2003) ("There is what one might call a 'zone of plausibility' in financial valuations, ranging anywhere from plus or minus fifteen to plus or minus thirty percent.").
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into the hands of the court.28 Judicial reasoning about damages reveals a
staggering number of choices courts must make, as a sampling of cases
quickly demonstrates.2 9
For example, in Antoine v. United States,30 a member of the Rosebud
Sioux Indian Tribe claimed the government had expropriated 320 acres of
Indian allotment land from his grandfather in 1884. The court found that
the government's action a century earlier had been a taking, but denied
plaintiff replacement value for the property or any measure of lost profits.
Instead, the court based compensation on the fair market value of the property at the time of the expropriation back in 1884: $3.89 per acre.31 Applying a 5% annual interest rate, the district court arrived at a total award of
only $7262 for the 320 acres of land.32 The timing of the fair market value
determination is often critical to the ultimate award.
33 illustrates
A.A. Profiles, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale
problems
identifying property's highest and best use. There, plaintiff purchased
property to operate a wood-chipping and organic waste processing facility.
After a public outcry, the City of Fort Lauderdale downzoned the property
to prohibit the intended use, and the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that this was a compensable taking.34 The lower court, however,
did not award damages because it found that the plaintiff's proposed facility
was underfinanced and "doomed even absent the City's actions."35 According to the district court, the goal of compensation was to place the plaintiff
in the same position she would have occupied but for the taking. Compensation was therefore unnecessary because the plaintiff's project would have
failed even without the taking. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed and remanded the case, instructing the district court to award compensation based
on the property's diminution of value as a result of the downzoning.36 But
judgments about the highest and best use for property are complicated, at
28 While there would undoubtedly be an interesting story to tell about actual dollar values awarded
by juries in takings cases, this Article focuses on the legal decisions defining the contours of the damages inquiry instead of the amount of money awarded at the end of the day. At least one commentator
has suggested leaving such a difficult question entirely to the jury. See Burney, supra note 4, at 799.
29 A recent case exemplifying the contested nature of valuation is Verizon Communications,
Inc. v.
FCC,535 U.S. 467 (2002), in which the Supreme Court examined the tortured history of valuing rates
of return in the highly regulated telecommunications industry. This Article follows the lead of most
other takings scholarship, however, and ignores the Fifth Amendment implications of government ratemaking functions. No doubt a fascinating compensation story could also be told about this understudied
area of law.
30 710 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1983).
31 Antoine v. United States, 537 F. Supp. 1163, 1168 (D.S.D. 1982).
32 Id. The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the case, but only for further
consideration of
the appropriate interest rate. See Antoine, 710 F.2d at 480.
33 253 F.3d 576 (1Ith Cir. 2001).
34 Id. at 582.
35 Id. at 585 n.12.
36 Id. at 585.
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best, and the court of appeals did not explain why prohibiting a use that was
not economically feasible in the first place would have reduced the property's fair market value.
Herrington v. County of Sonoma37 addresses the difficult compensation
problem presented when some less restrictive governmental action would
not have been a taking. There, Sonoma County denied the plaintiffs' application for a residential subdivision building permit. The district court
agreed the permit denial was a taking but held that the plaintiffs might not
have been entitled to construct the project they wanted. The district court
therefore reduced the value of the taken property by the chance that regulatory approvals would have been permissibly denied, expressing its methodology as:
[(aX + bY) - Y] Rt + ac
In which:
a = probability of approval of 32 lots
b = probability that 32 lots would not be approved
(a + b = 100%).
X = value of the land with a 32-lot subdivision potential (not more than
$1.3 million).
Y = value of the land with no development (not less than $490,000).
(aX + b Y) = weighted probability of approval of 32 lots.
R = rate of interest.
t = duration of the delay after December 11, 1979.
38
c = increased costs of development resulting from the delay.
Considering each of these cases in isolation may suggest that compensation is entirely fact-specific, and, therefore, not amenable to broader theoretical categorization.39 This takes too myopic a view of the problem. In
fact, disagreements over valuation can be arranged around a few central
valuation mechanisms that dramatically affect the amount of a property
owner's ultimate recovery. The following section identifies nine of these
valuation mechanisms and examines their effect on compensation, while
providing judicial illustrations of their application.

37 790 F. Supp. 909 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
38 Id. at 916.
39 See Wallace v. United States, 566 F. Supp. 904, 910 (D. Mass. 1981) ("[Clontroversies over

valuation are not governed by fixed rules. Thus, a case cannot be decided by selecting some formula as
the only correct one, then determining figures to be used in each step of the formula and proceeding
through mathematical calculation to the foreordained result."); cf Porter v. Yukon Nat'l Bank, 866 F.2d
355, 357 (10th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he matrix within which questions of solvency and valuation exist in
bankruptcy demands that there be no rigid approach taken to the subject."). This undoubtedly accounts,
at least in part, for the absence of theoretical work in the area.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Although courts are explicit about using fair market value to value takings, the valuation mechanisms identified below are implicit in courts' application of that standard. They come from courts' reasoning about the
application of fair market value on the facts of specific cases. To be clear,
it is often necessary to look behind the text of courts' valuation decisions to
identify generalizable valuation mechanisms because courts seldom acknowledge-or are not aware of-the substantive decisions they are making. Nevertheless, any application of the fair market value standard is
inextricably tied up with these valuation mechanisms whether courts admit
it or not.

One initial caveat is in order. This Article's explicit focus is on the
role of compensation in regulatory takings. Courts, however, are much
more likely to discuss compensation in the context of eminent domain proceedings or condemnation actions.4" Because the compensation standard for
eminent domain and condemnation is also the fair market value of the property taken, these are considered together with regulatory takings cases and
are described generically as various forms of governmental action.4'
There is an additional justification for this approach. The power of
eminent domain lurks behind much regulatory takings doctrine. Even
where courts enjoin local land use restrictions instead of-or in addition
to-awarding compensation, a local government can still choose to condemn the property.4 2 Although the condemnation proceeding is formally
distinct from the initial regulatory takings claim, the compensation the government must ultimately pay for exercising its power of eminent domain defines, in a very practical sense, the content of a property owner's rights
against the government's regulatory power. In this way, compensation
turns out to be a medium for incorporating constitutional theory from the
regulatory takings context into eminent domain. Eminent domain also calls
on courts to define the content of private property rights but, because the
government's liability is not at issue, exclusively in the form of compensation. This Article's project can therefore be described either as incorporating eminent domain's compensation analysis into the regulatory takings
40 Merrill also uses eminent domain proceedings and condemnation
actions when discussing compensation for takings. See Merrill, supra note 26, at 120-21.
41 This Article examines valuation decisions in
both regulatory takings and eminent domain cases.
While the latter may implicate a different set of concerns, cf id. at 110 ("Valuation techniques that have
been developed in the context of formal expropriation may not translate readily to regulations that leave
possession undisturbed, but reduce the value or profitability of property."), they are nevertheless instructive about the range of valuation decisions available to courts. In many eminent domain or condemnation proceedings, valuation is the only issue before the court and those cases often provide the most
thoroughgoing analysis of the issue.
42 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321
(1987) ("Once a court determines that a taking has occurred, the government retains the whole range of
options already available-amendment of the regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, or
exercise of eminent domain.").
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context, or incorporating takings' constitutional theory into eminent domain.
B.
1.

The Valuation Mechanisms

Harm Versus Gain.-The first valuation decision faced by any

court is whether to measure the harm to the property owner or the gain to
the government caused by the taking.43 Courts have their choice of competing axioms in this regard. One provides that damages are to be measured
by the property owner's harm." But another axiom holds that takings are to

45
be valued by the government's gain and not the property owner's loss. In

many cases, harm and gain will be symmetrical, but this is not always true.

Choosing between the two can make a significant difference in the ultimate
compensation award. As one court noted, "there is often a substantial gap
between value to the owner and value to others-the government, a hypothetical buyer, or the public at large."46
There are a number of reasons why harm-based compensation could

result in a higher award than valuation based on the government's gain.
Even putting aside traditionally non-compensable harms, like consequential

damages or lost profits,47 some property has a particular use to the property
43 For a discussion of this distinction between valuing takings by harm versus gain, see Serkin, supra note 4, at 424-27.
44 See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949) ("Because gain to the taker,
on the other hand, may be wholly unrelated to the deprivation imposed upon the owner, it must also be
rejected as a measure of public obligation to requite for that deprivation.") (citations omitted); United
States v. John J. Felin & Co., 334 U.S. 624, 629 (1948) ("In enforcing [the Fifth Amendment] the question is 'what has the owner lost, not what has the taker gained."' (quoting Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910))); A.A. Profiles, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 253
F.3d 576, 583 (1Ith Cir. 2001) ("The starting point for any inquiry into damages in a takings cases [sic]
is to query what has the owner lost?") (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court most recently reiterated this point in Brown v. Legal Foundationof Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 236 (2003).
45 See United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 282 (1943) ("[T]he sovereign must pay only for what it takes, not for opportunities which the owner may lose."); see also
Francini v. Town of Farmington, 557 F. Supp. 151, 157 (D. Conn. 1982) ("[lit is well-settled that a constitutionally cognizable 'taking' requires the sovereign to pay for what it actually gains, not for what the
plaintiff has lost."); Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 394, 407 (1984) ("The sovereign
must pay for what it takes, not for opportunities the owner loses."). In support of this judicial rule, Benjamin Hermalin has argued: "To induce an agent to act in a socially efficient manner (e.g., invest correctly), the agent's objective must be equivalent, on the appropriate margin, to society's objective. This
can be accomplished only by incorporating the social benefit into the agent's reward function." Benjamin E. Hermalin, An Economic Analysis of Takings, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 64, 66 (1995).
46 D.C. Redevelopment Land Agency v. Thirteen Parcels of Land in Squares 859, 912, 934 & 4068,
534 F.2d 337, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
47 See Yuba Natural Res. Inc. v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing Kimball Laundry and General Motors and concluding that "[iut is a well settled principle of Fifth Amendment taking law, however, that the measure of just compensation is the fair value of what was taken, and
not the consequential damages the owner suffers as a result of the taking"); see also Rowland v. United
States, 8 Cl. Ct. 267, 271 (1985) (reviewing cases). In contrast, several states expressly require payment
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owner that is not reflected in its fair market value. This will often occur
where the property is used by its owner in connection with other neighboring property.4 8 Courts generally prohibit property owners from collecting
for that enhanced value, holding that the government is liable only for what
it takes, and not for the property owner's harm.49 A harm-based award
permits property owners to recover this enhanced value. °
In other situations, however, a gain-based award will result in dramatically higher compensation for a property owner. The government's gain
might be difficult to determine as, for example, with environmental or land
use regulations whose benefits, while no less real, are difficult to value." In
such cases, where gain is not immediately quantifiable, it is common to
value takings by the property owner's harm. 2 But when the purpose of the
taking is to create or facilitate a new commercial enterprise, for example, a
of consequential damages for certain eminent domain proceedings. See Mitchell v. United States, 267
U.S. 341, 345-46 (1925) (describing state law); City of Stillwell v. Ozarks Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 166
F.3d 1064, 1071-72 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying Oklahoma law and permitting award for "reintegration
costs"); City of Thibodaux v. La. Power & Light Co., 373 F.2d 870, 872 (5th Cir. 1967) ("The city contests the award for consequential damages but the award has an adequate evidentiary foundation, and is
clearly in order under the jurisprudence of Louisiana."); Ideal Leasing Servs., Inc. v. Whitfield County,
562 S.E.2d 790, 793 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) ("The measure of just and adequate compensation for the taking is first, the market value of the property actually taken; second, the consequential damage that will
naturally and proximately arise to the remainder of the owner's property .... (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citation omitted)).
48 This can occur when, for example, property has attendant grazing rights
on adjacent lands. See,
e.g., David Abelson, Water Rights and Grazing Permits: Transforming Public Lands into Private
Lands, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 407, 415-16 (1994) (citing United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973)).
49 Fuller, 409 U.S. at 500 ("While as condemnor the Government
must pay market value, as property owner it may change the use of its property as if it were a private party, without paying compensation for the loss in value suffered by neighboring land."); United States v. 57.09 Acres of Land, 757 F.2d
1025, 1029 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Daniel D. Bamhizer, Givings Recapture: Funding Public Acquisition of PrivateProperty Interests on the Coasts, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 295, 362 (2003) (noting that
some compensation rules "prohibit[] compensation for any value attributable to association of the condemned tract with preexisting or dominant government property rights"); Barnhizer, supra, at 367-69.
It is interesting to note, however, that severance damages may be an exception to this rule. In the case
of a partial taking, severance damages are sometimes awarded for damage done to the owner's remaining property as a result of the taking. See, e.g., United States v. 4.0 Acres of Land, 175 F.3d 1133, 1139
(9th Cir. 1999) ("The diminution in value of the remaining property is called 'severance damages."' (citation omitted)); Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1383-84 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("[O]nce a taking is
adjudged, plaintiffs will have the opportunity to establish their severance damages, the damages accruing to their retained land as a result of the taking."). This is at least in tension with a gain-based award
and appears to compensate the owner for her harm.
50 See Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States,
409 U.S. 470 (1973) (including
expected value of lease renewal as part of fair market value calculation).
51 Indeed, the costs associated with determining the government's
gain might eclipse the value of
the regulation. At the least, those costs might transform a net efficient regulation into an inefficient
regulation whose costs are greater than the gains secured.
52 See, e.g., Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. 118 Acres of Land,
745 F. Supp. 366 (E.D. La. 1990).
Even where the government's gain can be readily quantified, the Supreme Court has sometimes awarded
harm-based damages. E.g., Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003).
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property owner's compensation can be increased if she is allowed to capture
at least some of the benefit of the new enterprise. 3 Likewise, the government can create value by bundling property that transaction costs would
prevent the market from bundling on its own. 4 Using that higher, bundled
value as the basis for compensation also results in higher awards than harmbased valuation. Compensation, then, can respond to the purpose of the
government's action and provide for a portion of the government's gain,
especially when the taking is for a commercial use.5
2. Allocating Risk: Highest and Best Use.-It is black letter law that
fair market value is based on the value of property as put to its most profitable use, usually referred to as its highest and best use. 6 In the market, a
real buyer and seller would consider the property's highest and best use to
arrive at a fair transaction price. 7 Even if a specific prospective buyer does
53 For example, New York City recently condemned property from several property owners to deed
to the New York Times. See generally West 41st Street Realty LLC v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp.,
744 N.Y.S.2d 121 (App. Div. 2002). The property owners' compensation would presumably have been
far higher if they had been permitted to share in the profits of the New York Times. It is precisely the
potential ability of property owners to hold out for a share of a project's gain that is widely cited as a
justification for the power of eminent domain. E.g., THOMAS J. MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW 138
(1997).
54 See Brown, 538 U.S. at 221-23. This is a form of creating value by the government overcoming
a tragedy of the anticommons, as described by Michael Heller in his important article. See Michael A.
Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transitionfrom Marx to Markets, Ill HARV.
L. REV. 621, 623 (1998).
55 Cf United States v. 0.88 Acres of Land, 670 F. Supp. 210, 211 (W.D. Mich. 1987) ("[D]amages
for the loss of goodwill or loss of the going-concern value of a business are not compensable unless the
government has condemned the business property with the intention of carrying on the business." (emphasis added)); United States v. 0.38 Acres of Land, 117 F. Supp. 217, 221 (E.D.N.Y. 1954) (awarding
additional $20,000 to fair market value of property to reflect government's intention to continue to use
the property as a film storage facility). Early interpretations of the Takings Clause viewed government
actions differently if they involved business entities "clothed with a public interest." Treanor, supra
note 19, at 800. This is a suggestion with timely and practical importance. The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004), cert. granted, 125
S. Ct. 27 (2004), positioning the Court to decide whether a local government is allowed to take property
on behalf of a commercial enterprise under the Fifth Amendment's "Public Use" requirement. Instead
of treating this as a yes-or-no question, the Court could permit the government to condemn property for
commercial uses, but only by paying at least some portion of the resulting gain. See James E. Krier &
Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. I (forthcoming).
56 See United States v.320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d 762, 781 (5th Cir. 1979) (valuing property by
its highest and best use); see also A.A. Profiles, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 253 F.3d 576, 583 (1 1th
Cir. 2001) (quoting 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d at 781). In fact, courts are sometimes required to apply this standard. See, e.g., 43 C.F.R. § 2201.3-2(a) (2004) (requiring, in context of federal land acquisitions, that an "appraiser shall ...[d]etermine the highest and best use of the property to be appraised").
57 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d at 781 ("[S]ince a hypothetical, 'reasonable man' buyer will purchase land with an eye to not only its existing use but to other potential uses as well, fair market value
takes into consideration '[t]he highest and most profitable use for which the property isadaptable and
needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably near future ... to the full extent that the prospect of demand for such use affects the market value while the property is privately held.' Thus, 'just compensation' is not limited to the value of the property as presently used, but includes any additional market
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not intend to put the property to its highest and best use, a seller will still
decide on a price at which she is willing to sell by considering the property's value to a buyer who will use it to maximum benefit. The cost of developing a more intensive use is then subtracted from this highest-and-bestuse value of the property.
To take a simple residential example, if a swimming pool will add
$10,000 to the value of a house, and cost only $9000 to install, that extra
$1000 should be included in the present value of the house as part of the
property's highest and best use. If, however, as is often true, the value
added by installing a pool is equal to its cost, the prospect of adding a pool
has no impact on the property's value.
This is a valuation mechanism because applying the highest and best
use standard requires an allocation of the financial risk of developing property from its current condition into its highest and best use. 8 A more sophisticated example illustrates this point. Imagine that the highest and best
use of an undeveloped lot near the highway is a new shopping center, and a
prospective purchaser would likely buy the property with that use in mind.
The present value of the property, then, would be the as-developed value of
the shopping center minus the cost of development. But actually developing property is by no means a risk-free proposition. There are risks of permit denials, environmental hazards, cost overruns, unscrupulous
contractors, unanticipated pitfalls, and the basic risk that the project will not
be a commercial success. 9 These are risks that can be minimized or insured
against to a certain extent, but actions taken to minimize risk are themselves

value itmay command because of the prospects for developing it to the 'highest and best use' for which
it is suitable." (quoting Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934)).
58 The question of allocating risk only arises where the property is not being put to its highest and
best use at the time of the taking. This often occurs where, for example, a local government impermissibly denies building permits preventing a property owner from developing the property's highest and
best use. It can also arise whenever the current use is not the highest and best use, although courts have
developed a rebuttable presumption that a property's present use is its highest and best use. See United
States v. 69.1 Acres of Land, 942 F.2d 290, 292 (4th Cir. 1991).
59 These risks of development include the following:
Design error; Overrun in design budget; Delay in design; Time and cost overruns due to performance by third parties; Time and cost overruns in design caused by the owner; Acceleration costs to
bring the design within the design schedule; Construction defects; Overrun in the construction
budget; Construction cost overruns due to estimating errors; Delay in completion of construction;
Acceleration costs to bring construction within the construction schedule; Discovery of hazardous
materials on site; Force majeure which results in time and cost overruns; Unforeseen site conditions which are not the owner's contractual responsibility; Owners [sic] failure to pay; Indemnification for performance and labor and material payment bonds; Carrying costs associated with
fulfilling unwarranted demands of the owner until recovery is obtained; Liability of subcontractors
resulting from design defects; Cost overruns resulting from subcontractor or supplier defaults; Insurance obligations; Indemnification obligations in the contract; Fees and expenses for pursuing
claims.
Jesse B. Grove, Risk Allocation from the Contractor'sPerspective,467 PLI/REAL 41,123-24 (2001).
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costly. 6 The baseline rules about who bears development risks are reflected
in the property's fair market value, and therefore affect compensation.
A compensation award can implicitly shift these development risks between the property owner and the government in a number of ways. It is
perhaps counterintuitive to think of shifting development risks in valuing
takings because the property will not, in fact, be developed into its highest
and best use; shifting risk in this context is a purely theoretical exercise
where the right to develop the property has been appropriated by the government. Still, expanding and contracting the anticipated development
costs that would have been necessary to create the property's highest and
best use will shift the burden of those risks of development in a hypothetical
transaction between a willing buyer and a willing seller. Including insurance costs and fees associated with permit applications will lower the present value of the property by shifting costs to the property owner.61
Development costs can even be increased to reflect the possibility of unanticipated problems, like regulatory approvals being denied.62
Most fundamental, but largely unnoticed, is the decision to award
compensation based on projections of the as-developed value of the property, discounted only by the costs associated with the actual development.63
Since, by definition, the highest and best use for a property must be commercially feasible, 64 appraisals of the as-developed property will not include

60

In the most general terms, due diligence will minimize certain development risks like the possi-

bility of environmental contamination. Also, developers insure their projects against other risks that are
not so easily anticipated, like fire and theft. Neither is costless, however, and shifting those costs between parties can fundamentally alter the value of a property to a specific party.
61 See Cooley v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 538 (2000) (allocating development costs to the property
owner), rev'd in part on other grounds, 324 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In Cooley, the district court
calculated the property's highest and best use by determining the as-developed value of the property,
and then reducing that value by (1)"cost of sales, promotion and advertising"; (2) direct development
costs; (3) indirect costs including real estate taxes and liability insurance; and (4) holding costs, including interest and financing. Id. at 551. The plaintiff objected on grounds that the local market in Minnesota "is comprised of developers who would not have to pay for most of these costs, and these
developers would accordingly value the property at a much higher price." Id. The Court rejected the
plaintiffs argument and allocated all of the development costs to the property owner, including insurance costs. Id. at 552.
62 See infra text accompanying notes 259-266 (describing Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 790 F.
Supp. 909 (N.D. Cal. 1991)).
63 See, e.g., Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422 (9th Cir. 1996);
see also infra text accompanying notes 245-250; see also Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28
F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In Loveladies, a claims court entered judgment for the plaintiff in the
amount of $2,658,000 for a denial of a permit by the Army Corps of Engineers to fill in 11.5 acres of
wetlands. Id. at 1173-74. Plaintiffs had claimed that the highest and best use of the property was as a
forty-lot residential development, the gross value of which was estimated at $3,720,000. Loveladies
Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 155 (CL. Ct. 1990). The Court of Claims reduced this
amount only by hard costs the landowner would have incurred to develop the property. See id.
64 See, e.g., Stephen Sussna, The Concept of Highest and Best Use Under Takings Theory, 21 URB.
LAW. 113, 113 (1989) ("Highest and best use can be defined as a use that has the following characteris-
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any unpredicted risks derailing the development, or the risk that the contemplated project would not have been a commercial success.65 As a consequence, the property owner will receive more than she would have
received from an actual purchaser of the undeveloped property. In other
words, a real buyer will not usually pay the full value of the as-developed
property minus only out-of-pocket development costs, but will further discount that value to reflect development risks and the need to make a profit.
Courts are inconsistent in how they treat the allocation of risk between
the parties and the identification of development costs.66 Therefore, "highest and best use" does not define a single, objective measure of value but, at
best, a broad range of values that courts can still call "fair market value,"
wherever they fall along this spectrum.
3. Permissible but Unenacted Regulations.-The third valuation
mechanism turns on where courts draw the line in offsetting the value of
permissible regulations.67 Property values are affected by applicable regulations. For enacted regulations, this is to suggest nothing more than that
property's fair market value reflects the existing regulatory framework.68
Just as tax rates are capitalized into property values, otherwise indistinguishable parcels of land are worth very different amounts if they are zoned
differently.69 Just compensation therefore depends upon pre-existing regulations.
tics: (1) it is legally and physically possible; (2) it is appropriately supported; (3) it is financially feasible; and (4) it results in the highest land value.").
65 In fact, at least one court has removed the risk to the plaintiffs that their project would not have
been an above average success. See Del Monte Dunes, 95 F.3d at 1435 (upholding a jury award based
upon higher-than-average rates of return reflecting the jury's opinion that the development would have
been an above-average success); see also Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 896 F.2d 1347, 1351-52
(11th Cir. 1981) (comparing value of property as regulated with the value of the property as if it had
been developed, reduced by landowners equity interest and multiplied by a fair rate of return). A.A. Profiles, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 253 F.3d 576 (1 lth Cir. 2001), is also illustrative. Plaintiff's organic waste processing plant was in foreclosure when the city impermissibly rezoned the property,
forbidding the plant. Id. at 580 n.3. The district court found that plaintiff had not incurred any damages,
but the Eleventh Circuit remanded, holding that plaintiffs "precarious financial state and the later foreclosure are relevant only to the extent that they could have affected the property's market value." Id. at
585. Plaintiff's own track record demonstrated that the property was not viable as a treatment facility in
which case it may have incurred no damages as a result of the taking. Id. at 581.
66 Compare Branning v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 618 (1984) (excluding all anticipated profits), with
Del Monte Dunes, 95 F.3d at 1435 (upholding higher than average rate of return). Both cases are discussed in greater depth in Part Ill.
67 See Lemmons v. United States, 204 Ct. Cl. 404, 423 (1974) ("One is not entitled to recover elements of value that the Government ...might have destroyed under exercise of government authority
other than power of eminent domain.").
68 In some cases, the value of the property as permissibly regulated can eliminate all damages. See
Yaist v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 246, 259-60 (1989) (finding that plaintiff suffered no compensable
taking for value of a dock built on navigable waters because "the erection of the structure was unlawful
and the United States could have sought an injunction for the removal of the dock").
69 See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 40-42 (2001).
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Property, however, is also subject to permissible but as yet unenacted
regulations, i.e., restrictions the government could impose without paying
compensation.7" Here the impact on fair market value is slightly more complicated, requiring buyers and sellers to discount the impact of a potential
regulation by the chance it will be enacted. While the market is relatively
adept at these computations, they pose a particular challenge to courts and
offer another valuation mechanism. As a practical matter, differences in the
aggressiveness with which courts identify the permissible level of regulation that would not be a taking can dramatically shift a property owner's recovery.
One clear example of the impact of potential regulations on compensation awards is in the body of law that has developed around the taking of
fastlands-that is, property above the high-water mark of navigable waters.
The Supreme Court has held categorically that because the federal government has a plenary right to regulate navigable waters, the Fifth Amendment
does not require compensation for the enhanced value of such property arising out of its location adjacent to navigable waters.7" Courts valuing such
property have therefore relied on comparable sales of non-riparian lands,
which are usually worth much less on the open market.72 In other words,
because the government could permissibly have eliminated all use of the
navigable water without paying compensation, just compensation for taking
riparian land does not include the value of the use of the navigable water,
even though the government had not restricted that use before the appropriation.73
70 This insight implicitly motivates the ripeness doctrine in takings law. In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), petitioner challenged Rhode Island's denial of a wetlands fill permit on his
coastal property. Rhode Island argued, in part, that while it denied an application to fill all of the petitioner's wetlands property, it might not have denied an application to fill only five of the twenty acres.
Id. at 619. In other words, Rhode Island was asserting a right to deny some level of development and
argued that petitioner had an obligation to identify the level of development the State would have permitted before his claim could become ripe. As the Supreme Court observed, "a landowner may not establish a taking before a land-use authority has the opportunity, using its own reasonable procedures, to
decide and explain the reach of a challenged regulation." Id. at 620.
71 See United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123-24 (1967) (holding that the Constitution "permits
the Government to disregard the value arising from [the] fact of riparian location in compensating the
owner when fast lands are appropriated" (citation omitted)). According to the Third Circuit, "[t]he value
of land that arises from its riparian location does not inhere in these parcels, but depends on use of water
to which the landowner has no right as against the United States." United States v. 30.54 Acres of Land,
90 F.3d 790, 794 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Rands, 389 U.S. at 124) (internal quotation marks omitted).
72 Congress has abrogated this principle on at least one occasion, however, requiring in certain circumstances that compensation should be valued based on the property's riparian location. See River &
Harbors Act of 1970, 33 U.S.C. § 595a (2000).
73 This is related to, but distinct from, the doctrine surrounding navigation servitudes. According to
long-standing common law, the government need not compensate property owners for takings of "riparian, littoral, or submerged lands which, if not for the fact that a waterway is involved, would require
compensation under the [F]ifth [A]mendment." Boone v. United States, 944 F.2d 1489, 1494 (9th Cir.
1991).

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Reducing awards for unenacted but permissible regulations is not limited to resources over which the government has plenary power. Assume,
for example, the government could permissibly regulate a factory's emissions by requiring the installation of scrubbers, but that forcing the factory
to cease operating entirely would constitute a taking. 4 How much compensation should the government pay if it chooses the latter course and forces
the factory to close? Prior to the regulation, the factory did not possess an
unencumbered right to pollute. Therefore, paying the value of the factory at
its most noxious-as it presumably existed just prior to the regulationwould grant a windfall to the owner. Instead, in this simplified example,
the value of the factory should be reduced by the cost of the scrubbers that
the government could have forced the factory to install.
Of course, it is by no means a simple task to value property subject to
permissible but unenacted regulations. In the example above, not only
could the government have forced the factory to install scrubbers, it could
also have required new fire safety equipment, certain beautification of
neighboring lands, and even higher pay for its workers. Should these potential compliance costs be deducted from the factory's value? At what
point would those potential costs become too high? When they surpass the
appraised value of the unregulated factory? 5 Where courts draw these lines
can have a significant impact on compensation.
4. Benefit Offset and Average Reciprocity of Advantage.-Valuing
regulatory benefits is another mechanism influencing the assessment of fair
market value. In the case of a partial taking, compensation is regularly offset by any benefit to the remaining property conferred by the regulation. In
the paradigmatic case, damages arising from the condemnation of a sliver of
property for a new road are offset by the enhanced value of the owner's remaining property as a result of the road. 6
This straightforward concept proves particularly difficult to apply because principled lines are hard to draw. What neighboring property is included? How direct does the benefit to the remaining property have to be?
74 This might result, for example, from an application of the diminution of value test. See,
e.g., Fla.
Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
75 One can imagine a quantification of this approach that considers only those permissible but
unenacted regulations that would have addressed the same purpose as the taking. In the present example, it
would offset the value of the taking by the cost of scrubbers but not a new fire system. While such an
approach seems desirable in this simplified example, it may become quickly unworkable in the context
of real-world takings in part because it may be impossible for courts to identify the purpose of the regulation, or to identify those potential but unenacted regulations that would have addressed the same concem without effectuating a taking. For present purposes, it is enough to acknowledge that line-drawing
in this area is imprecise at best.
76 See, e.g., FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 81; see also Daryl J. Levinson, FramingTransactionsin
Constitutional Law, Ill YALE L.J. 1311, 1339 (2002) ("In nineteenth-century railroad eminent domain
cases, for example, just compensation for the value of land taken was routinely reduced by the amount
of the increase in value that accrued to the remainder of the parcel.").
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What range of benefits will a court consider? These are the same issues that
appear in the regulatory takings context in the "average reciprocity of advantage" test, traditionally a test for whether or not a regulatory taking has
occurred.77 According to the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon," a property owner receiving an average reciprocity of advantage
from the government serves as an absolute bar to recovery. The Supreme
Court has used this reasoning to uphold zoning laws, 9 and as a compensation rule it makes good sense. A property owner who, on balance, was unharmed by a governmental action should not be entitled to compensation.
Viewed through this Article's compensation lens, reciprocity of advantage
is nothing more than a commonsense conclusion under the benefit offset
test: property owners who benefit more from a regulation than they are burdened have suffered no damages.8"
The problem of identifying and valuing offsetting benefits gives courts
wide valuation discretion.8' Some courts have held that benefits must be
narrowly drawn to include only those benefits conferred directly from the
contested governmental action itself.82 But other courts have proposed
enlarging the range of benefits they will consider to find a property owner

77 See Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity ofAdvantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward a New Theory of Takings Jurisprudence,40 AM. U. L. REv. 297, 301 n. 18 (1990) (identifying the range of interpretations courts have adopted of "average reciprocity of advantage").
78 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (distinguishing Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531
(1914), on grounds that in the prior case no taking had occurred because the property owners had received an "average reciprocity of advantage"). As another court has explained:
When there is reciprocity of advantage, paradigmatically in a zoning case, then the claim that the
Government has taken private property has little force: the claimant has in a sense been compensated by the public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good.
Fla. Rock, 18 F.3d at 1570 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
79 See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (finding no compensable taking where property owner received reciprocity of advantage); cf Coletta, supra note 77, at 302 ("Governmental regulation of land use is ... justified by the reciprocal benefits that accrue to the burdened
individuals. [Zoning] ordinances do not give rise to a takings challenge either because it is thought that
benefits outweigh burdens and the regulations are, therefore, within the penumbra of substantive due
process, or, alternatively, that the benefits that accrue from the regulations provide the necessary compensation to satisfy fifth amendment guarantees.").
80 In a footnote, Justice Stevens implicitly rejected one form of this view:

The Takings Clause has never been read to require the States or the courts to calculate whether a
specific individual has suffered burdens under this generic rule in excess of the benefits received.
Not every individual gets a full dollar return in benefits for the taxes he or she pays; yet, no one
suggests that an individual has a right to compensation for the difference between taxes paid and
the dollar value of benefits received.
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 n.21 (1987).
81 See Coletta, supra note 77, at 364-65; Dagan, supra note 5, at 768-77.
82 See. e.g., Fla. Rock, 18 F.3d at 1571 ("[T]rial court[s] must consider: are there direct compensating benefits accruing to the property, and other similarly situated, flowing from the regulatory environment?").
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has received an average reciprocity of advantage.83 Richard Epstein has
considered the problem in some detail, arguing for a nuanced and contextdependent approach to including offsetting benefits, what he calls "implicit
in-kind benefits."84 In a recent article, Daniel Barnhizer has even proposed
a complicated ex ante procedure for offsetting anticipatory benefits from
coastal and floodplain property in order to separate out from such property
the added value (the benefit) attributable to government-provided insur85
ance.

While courts and commentators continue to disagree about the proper
application of benefit offset and reciprocity of advantage,86 the stakes in the
disagreement are clear: the broader the range of benefits a court will consider, the lower the compensation the property owner will receive. The
range of possibilities includes anything from an offset for specific benefits
from the regulation, to long-term benefits like the abstract benefits of membership in the community.87 In terms of an actual dollar value of awards,
this can range from no offset to a total offset that is synonymous with a
finding that no taking occurred.
5. Timing of the Valuation.-Takings are to be valued on the date the
property is taken.88 This proposition is easy enough to state but another
matter to apply. The basic problem arises because the prospect of an imminent government action has an impact on fair market value prior to the action itself. As an example, condemnations do not happen instantaneously.
Government planning can give the public years of advance notice before
property is actually expropriated for a public project like a park or a new

83 See, e.g., Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491 ("The Court's hesitance to
find a taking when the State
merely restrains uses of property that are tantamount to public nuisances is consistent with the notion of
'reciprocity of advantage' .... While each of us is burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we, in tum,
benefit greatly from the restrictions that are placed on others."); cf Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825, 856 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Allowing appellants to intensify development along the
coast in exchange for ensuring public access to the ocean is a classic instance of government action that
produces a reciprocity of advantage."); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 133-34
(1978); Levinson, supra note 73, at 1340 (identifying additional cases).
84 EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 195-215. Epstein's views are
difficult to summarize briefly, but one
pithy quote summarizes the gist of his analysis: "As a first approximation, the formula for sound general legislation is simple: special burdens for special benefits; general burdens for general benefits." Id.
at 212.
85 Barnhizer, supra note 49, at 367-69.
86 See, e.g., Dagan, supra note 5, at 768 ("Reciprocity of advantage
is a familiar concept in takings
jurisprudence. Nonetheless, in law-as well as in life-reciprocity is a contested concept that admits of
different conceptions."); see also generally Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of the "Harm/Benefit " and "Average Reciprocity of Advantage" Rules in a Comprehensive Takings Analysis, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1449,
1490-1510 (1997). In Part IID, this Article proposes one potential resolution to the contested nature of
reciprocal benefits.
87 See Dagan, supra note 5, at 768.
88 E.g., United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506,
511-13 (1979).
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road.89 During that time, the property's marketability will decrease dramatically-who wants to buy property that is about to be condemned?and its value will drop accordingly. By the time the government actually
condemns the property, its fair market value will be significantly less than if
the government had never contemplated the project in the first place. This
pre-condemnation effect on property values has been appropriately dubbed
"condemnation blight."9
Courts have responded to this phenomenon in a variety of ways. Some
have simply denied compensation for the loss in value due to condemnation
blight, applying the rigid rule that compensation is valued at the date of the
actual expropriation of property.9" Other courts, however, have rolled back
92
the valuation date by finding a de facto taking prior to the actual taking.
This has the effect of valuing the property prior to the detrimental impact of
a proposed government action. But finding a defacto taking has additional
consequences, for example, creating liability for the government for any
loss in value prior to the formal condemnation, even if it resulted from
some other source.93 As a result, still other courts have used the date of the
condemnation as the benchmark for compensation but then disentangled the
depreciation in market value due to the government's action, and added that
back into the total compensation. The inquiries can become quite complex.95
The problem is not unique to condemnations-the same problems arise
in most regulatory takings.96 For example, land use controls or environmental regulations are not enacted overnight but only after a public process.
Accordingly, their impact on property values is felt long before the date of
89 Kanner, supra note 5, at 767-69.
90 See generally id.
91 E.g., Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1984); United States v. 3.95
Acres of Land, 470 F. Supp. 572, 574 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
92 The leading case is City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 269 N.E.2d 895 (N.Y. 1971). See also
Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
93 Klopping v. City of Whittier, 500 P.2d 1345, 1351 (Cal. 1972).
94 E.g., United States v. 38,994 Net Usable Square Feet of Space, No. 87 C 8569, 1989 WL 152806,
Nov. 21, 1989) (including information about actual losses suffered by the property
at *2 (N.D. Ill.
owner, even though they would not have been known at the time of the taking); cf Vaizburd v. United
States, 384 F.3d 1278, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (discussing the date of the taking resulting from the slow
buildup of sand on plaintiffs property, and upholding the district court's compromise result "when the
process of accretion had sufficient impact, i.e., impeded the plaintiffs' access to the water, and was sufficiently noticeable and recurring to constitute a taking" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
95 In United States v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 635-36 (1961), the Supreme
Court wrestled with the timing problem, holding, "the value of the easement is the nonriparian value of
the servient land discounted by the improbability of the easement's exercise. Itis to be emphasized that
in assessing this improbability, no weight should be given to the prospect of governmental appropriation." Performing this discounting without regard to the probability of the government taking the property is difficult, to say the least.
96 Only unforeseeable regulatory takings do not present this problem. Unexpected permit denials,
for example, may not create any form of condemnation blight.
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the regulation's ultimate enactment. This is the functional equivalent of
condemnation blight, and courts have the same range of compensation
choices available to them in the regulatory takings context.
These principles also apply, but in the opposite direction, to government actions that increase property values. The so-called "scope of the project rule" provides that the government need not pay for any increase in a
property's fair market value resulting from the government action itself.97
For example, if a new road will increase property values in an area, so that
comparable sales now include a premium attributable to the new road, the
government does not need to pay for that increase in value.98 This is, in
some sense, an inter-temporal version of the benefit-offset principle.
In many of these cases, then, the "as of' valuation date is just prior to
any impact on market value resulting from the possibility of some government action.99 The problem, of course, is deciding exactly how far back to
roll the date of valuation because property values always reflect some capitalized risk of a government action.'
How is it possible to distinguish this
background risk from something more particularized? The inquiry may not
be difficult at the extremes; on the one hand is the abstract possibility of a
government action that has no discernable effect on a particular property;
on the other is a fully formulated government plan to condemn property that
will all but destroy the market value of the target property as soon as it is
formally enacted. In between these two positions lies a broad and difficult
middle ground.'

97 Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409
U.S. 470, 477-78 (1973) ("The
Government must pay just compensation for those interests probably within the scope of the project
from the time the Government was committed to it." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
98 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376-77
(1943).
99 See Abraham Bell, Not Just Compensation, 13
J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 29, 47 (2003) ("In every
case, the likelihood of a taking enters the market at some point, and at that point, the value of the property in the market changes to reflect the new information. Thus, properly, the baseline value of property
should never be viewed as incorporating a taking-rather, it should be viewed as the value the property
would hold in the market absent the likelihood of taking."); see also Paul R. Scott, The Double-Edged
Sword of ProjectInfluence, SJ051 ALI-ABA 157, 159 (2004) ("The general rule is that any increase or
decrease in fair market value caused by the public project for which the property is acquired, or the likelihood that property would be acquired for the project is to be disregarded in determining the amount of
compensation due to the land owner.").
100 Cf Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions,99 HARV. L. REv. 509,
517-19
(1986) (arguing that risk of government actions is capitalized into property values just like any other
risk). While Kaplow argues that the compensation requirement inefficiently insulates property owners
from the risk of government action, the absence of full indemnification means that at least some risk of
government regulatory actions is always included in property values. Id. at 537-41.
10l E.g., Gould v. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Auth.,
610 S.W.2d 360, 366 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980) ("[T]he rapid decline in Mrs. Gould's property actually did not commence before January 7, 1971,
during the plans and surveys period. It commenced rather after January 7, 1971, a date which we may
use as a starting point. Until that date, when the detailed plans were approved by the City Council, the
project had remained in the pupal stage.").

99:677 (2005)

The Meaning of Value

There is also an even deeper theoretical problem lurking in this inquiry. The value of some property is inextricably intertwined with the possibility of government action. Today, for example, owners of unregulated,
environmentally sensitive land know there is a possibility-even a probability-that land use regulations will be enacted, restricting the use of their
property. Indeed, many people have observed the perverse incentives this
can create to over-invest in developing property.10 2 When the predicted
regulations are enacted, though, what date should be chosen as a benchmark
for valuation? Possibilities include the date the regulations are actually enacted; the date the regulations are proposed; or even the date when scientific
findings about the importance of the land make regulation likely. There is
no reason in the abstract why one date is "correct" and choosing between
them will have a dramatic effect on compensation.
To summarize, when the prospect of government action decreases the
value of property, choosing an earlier valuation date will increase compensation. On the other hand, where a government action increases the value
of property in an area, choosing a later date will increase compensation.
Courts have fallen all along this wide spectrum.
6. Fees and Expenses.-Shifting litigation expenses to the government in takings cases constitutes another valuation mechanism. Federal law
permits courts to shift attorneys' fees and other expert fees to the prevailing
party in a § 1983 action to enforce the Takings Clause." 3 Admittedly, not
all takings claims are filed pursuant to § 1983; some plaintiffs rely directly
on the Fifth Amendment as a basis for relief. In those cases, federal courts
nevertheless retain the ability to award attorneys' fees pursuant to § 1988,
effectively permitting an award of fees to any prevailing plaintiff in a takings case. 0 4
Courts have limited discretion in disallowing fees. The Supreme Court
has held that prevailing plaintiffs "should ordinarily recover an attorney's

102E.g., Fischel, supra note 69, at 55-56 (quoting a landowner who built several buildings at the
edge of Seattle as saying, "If we were to do nothing, we could end up with a wetland and a wildlife
area."); David A. Dana, Natural Preservationand the Race to Develop, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 655 (1995).
10342 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000) provides, in relevant part, "The court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." This can include expert fees. See also
42 U.S.C. § 4654 (2000) (permitting property owner to recover fees against the United States when govemnment abandons a condemnation proceeding); United States v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202, 204 (1979)
(per curiam) (describing availability of litigation costs "when a condemnation action is dismissed as being unauthorized, when the Government abandons a condemnation, or when the property owner has recovered through an inverse condemnation action under the Tucker Act").
104See N.Y. State Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. v. Shaffer, 27 F.3d 834, 845 (2d Cir. 1994); Thorstenn v.
Barnard, 883 F.2d 217, 218 (3d Cir. 1989); Goss v. City of Little Rock, 151 F.3d 861, 865-66 (8th Cir.
1998) (awarding attorneys' fees under § 1988 despite plaintiffs failure to include § 1983 in the complaint). Some state courts take a different approach and require the complaint to include a demand for
fees. See Burton v. Clark County, 958 P.2d 343, 358 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust."'' 5
Nevertheless, here too courts exercise more discretion than it may seem, not
in whether to award fees at all but instead in choosing how much to award.
Like the broader compensation inquiry, the amount of litigation costs a
court awards under § 1988 depends in large part on how it characterizes the
fees and expenses at issue. In particular, the extent to which a court will
scrutinize the details of attorney billing records will have a significant effect
on the total award." 6 Moreover, courts generally award fees only for those
aspects of a litigation relating to the merits of the underlying § 1983 action,
and courts can draw this line broadly or narrowly. °7
From the government's perspective, this can amount to greater or
lesser compensation, putting more than the fair market value of the property
at stake when compensation is due. Of course, from the property owner's
perspective, awarding fees will never place her in a better position than she
would have occupied but for the taking; even theoretically it can do no
more than restore the pre-regulation state of affairs. Nevertheless, reimbursing litigation expenses can result in the government being forced to pay
damages far in excess of the burdened property's fair market value.0 8
7. Recharacterizing the Property Taken.-Sentimental attachments,
or a unique business enterprise, may prevent the market from accurately reflecting the value of property to its owner.0 9 Nevertheless, in a supposedly
bright line, but actually porous rule, the Supreme Court has precluded
105 Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S.
400, 402 (1968).

106 Frevach Land Co. v. Multnomah County, No. Cv. 99-1295,
2001 U.S.
LEXIS 22255, at
*36-37 (D. Or. Dec. 18, 2001), is an unusually detailed and therefore transparentDist.
case. There, the district court examined attorney time records line by line, distinguishing between tasks associated with
clerical or secretarial work, even though conducted by an attorney, id. at *36-37; filing for land use permits not directly related to litigation, id. at *42; and responding to summary judgment where the response was not sufficiently related to a meritorious § 1983 claim, id. at *46-47. The district court in
that case ultimately awarded $124,186.80 out of the $263,999 originally requested by the plaintiff. Id. at
*1, 105.
107 Compare Simi Investment Co. v. Harris County, 236 F.3d 240, 255 (5th Cir. 2000) (rejecting
portion of attorneys' fees for litigation of state suit arising out of same facts), with Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 481 F. Supp. 776, 783-89 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (permitting recovery for aspects of litigation only
tangentially related to a § 1983 claim).
108 Internationally, supercompensation is sometimes explicitly
awarded for takings. Australia, for
example, awards the fair market value plus a fixed percent as compensation for a taking. See Tsuyoshi
Kotaka et al., Taking Land: Compulsory Purchaseand Regulation of Land in Asian-Pacific Countries,
31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11184 (2001).

109 See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S.
506, 514 (1979) ("[lIt is not at all unusual
that property uniquely adapted to the owner's use has a market value on condemnation which falls far
short of enabling the owner to preserve that use. Such a situation may often arise, for example, where a
family home has been built to the owner's tastes, but is old and deteriorated, or where property, like respondent's camps, is exempt from regulations applicable to new facilities."); see also I L. ORGEL,
VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 14 (2d ed. 1953) ("[L]oss to the owner of nontransferable values deriving from his unique need for property or idiosyncratic attachment to it ... is
properly treated as part of the burden of common citizenship.").
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awarding just compensation based on the subjective value of the property
taken."' Despite this prohibition, damage awards can implicitly compensate for at least some subjective value by redefining the property taken to
include an owner's special use for her property."' Courts' discretion in this
regard effectively enables compensation for subjective attachments related,
113 Courts'
for example, to a building's special use,"' or a particular view.
ability to accept a wide range of characterizations of property is another
valuation mechanism because of the impact such characterizations can have
on the ultimate fair market value determination.
8. Net Harm.-The Supreme Court, in its most recent takings decision, Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington,"' held that compensation
for states' Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts ("IOLTA") programs should
be measured by the property owners' net harm." 5 IOLTA programs require
lawyers to deposit certain client funds in interest bearing accounts with the
interest payable to organizations providing legal services to the poor. The
Court held that such programs were, in fact, takings, but that no compensation was due because the client funds would not have generated positive net
interest if6 deposited on their own (due to fees and other administrative expenses)."'
Brown is still of too recent vintage to know how courts will apply the
net harm calculation in the future, but it presumably requires offsetting certain fees and expenses that the property owner would have had to bear but
for the governmental action. It is difficult to imagine how to draw a principled line around these costs, however, because most fees and expenses will
110

See United States v. 509 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 35 (1984) ("[Jjust compensation must be
measured by an objective standard that disregards subjective values which are only of significance to an
individual owner."); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949) ("The value of property
springs from subjective needs and attitudes; its value to the owner may therefore differ widely from its
value to the taker. Most things, however, have a general demand which gives them a value transferable
from one owner to another. As opposed to such personal and variant standards as value to the particular
owner whose property has been taken, this transferable value has an external validity which makes it a
fair measure of public obligation to compensate the loss incurred by an owner as a result of the taking of
his property for public use.").
III See, e.g., infra Part III.D (discussing Yancey v. United States, 915 F.2d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1990), in
which the court awarded the value of turkeys as breeding turkeys instead of as meat after outbreak of
pathogenic Avian Influenza). But see United States v. 62.50 Acres of Land, 953 F.2d 886, 890 (5th Cir.
1992) ("Even if the landowner shows that a potential use is profitable and that the property is adaptable
for that use, that use is not necessarily the measure of the value of the property. Instead, it is to be considered to the extent the prospect of demand for the use affects market value." (internal citations omitted)).
112 United States v. 0.38 Acres of Land, 117 F. Supp. 217 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
113 See Board of Comm'rs v. Crawford, 731 So. 2d 508 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
114 538 U.S. 216(2003).
115

note 4.
116

For a discussion of the case and its relationship to fair market value, see generally Serkin, supra
Brown, 538 U.S. at 237-40.
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already be included in the property's fair market value so that deducting
them again would be double counting. Nevertheless, to use the extreme example posed by the dissenters in Brown, if the government takes someone's
paycheck, is just compensation awarded if the value of the check is reduced
to reflect taxes that the property owner would have had to pay?" 7 Although
they have not done so yet, courts may seize upon this new net harm rule to
further adjust compensation in ways that are difficult to predict.
9. Replacement Value.-While takings are generally compensated by
the property's fair market value, courts have occasionally used the cost of
replacement as an alternative to fair market value."' Replacement value
will usually exceed any measure of the fair market value of the property, although it is still likely to provide something less than the property's subjective value to its owner."' Despite a general prohibition on awarding
replacement value, 2 ' a number of courts have carved out exceptions and
have awarded replacement value, for example, where market value is not

117 Id. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

118 While no clear rule has developed in federal courts to determine when
replacement value is the
appropriate measure of damages, certain states have developed relatively bright-line rules. For example,
New York courts have recognized that "[w]here property is unique ... fair market value may not represent adequate compensation. In the case of such 'specialty' property, the measure of damages will be
the replacement cost of the property minus depreciation." Heidorf v. Town of Northumberland, 985 F.
Supp. 250, 261 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (interpreting New York law). A set of four criteria have been developed in New York to determine whether property is special:
(1) the improvement must be unique and specially built for the specific purpose for which it is designed; (2) the improvement must have been made for a special use and must be so specially used;
(3) there must be no market for the type of property and no sales of property for such use, and (4)
the improvement must be an appropriate improvement at the time of the injury and its use must be
economically feasible and reasonably expected to be replaced.
Id.
l t9 See, e.g., United States v. Koen, 982 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1992)
("The building itself was
insured for its replacement value-an amount higher than its actual worth."); see also EPSTEN, supra
note 1, at 183 ("If the replacement cost lies between the general market value and some higher subjective valuation, then compensation is adequate because it permits the owner to duplicate the condemned
facilities and thus regain the subjective component of value from his original activities. Yet the owner
has no incentive to speak the truth if his subjective value is lower than replacement cost, which exposes
the government to a serious risk that the owner will simply pocket the money instead of acquiring or
constructing the substitute facilities.").
120 See, e.g., Snowbank Enters. Inc. v. United States, 6 Cl.
Ct. 476, 495 (considering and rejecting
replacement value); see also United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29-30 (1984) (rejecting
replacement value); United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506 (1979). In 564.54 Acres of
Land, the United States condemned land for a recreational project from the Lutheran Church which was
operating its own nonprofit summer camp on the property. The Church rejected the government's condemnation offer and demanded the property's replacement value. The Church argued that replacement
value was substantially higher "because the new facilities would be subject to financially burdensome
regulations from which existing facilities were exempt under grandfather provisions." 565.54 Acres of
Land, 441 U.S. at 508. The Court rejected the claim, finding that replacement costs would grant a windfall to the Church.
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readily available, 12' or where otherwise uncompensable consequential damages would be extremely high. 22 More generally, courts can award replacement value when awarding fair market value would result in manifest
value itself a valuation
injustice, 23 making the denial of replacement
24
mechanism because of courts' wide discretion.
C. Categoriesof Valuation

The valuation mechanisms at courts' disposal can be used to shift dramatically the level of compensation due from case to case. There may even
be other mechanisms hiding in the case law. 125 The list assembled and identified in this Article is not necessarily exhaustive, but it does identify those
See Yaist v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 246, 260 (1989) (calculating "reproduction cost" where no
comparable sales of fishing cabins in the Florida Everglades existed); see also City of Grand Prairie v.
Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 405 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1969) (awarding replacement value); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. Madison Parish Police Jury, 465 F. Supp. 168 (W.D. La. 1977) (same).
122 See, e.g., Hedstrom Lumber, Inc. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 16 (1984). There, a federal moratorium on logging in a newly-protected wilderness was held to be a taking of a timber contract. The Hedstrom Lumber Company owned a sawmill in northeastern Minnesota and entered into lumber contracts
to harvest sufficient timber to "keep [its] sawmill in operation all year." Id. at 22. Rejecting the plaintiff's claim for lost profits, the court nonetheless "determine[d] that the appropriate standard to be applied.., is that of replacement value. The plaintiff is to be put in the same position, from a monetary
standpoint, as he would have been without the taking." Id. The Court concluded that the plaintiff
should be entitled to the cost of procuring substitute timber for its mill. This is related to the Federal
Circuit's "cost of cure" theory in Vaizburd v. United States, 384 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2004), in which
the Federal Circuit remanded a case to the trial court to determine whether plaintiffs were entitled to the
cost of removing sand deposits from their property resulting from a beach reclamation project. The
Vaizburd court noted that the property had not decreased in value as a result of the sand deposits but that
plaintiffs may nevertheless be entitled to restore the property to its original condition.
123 E.g., United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950).
124 In United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24 (1984), the United States condemned a fiftyacre landfill owned by the town of Duncanville, Texas as part of a flood control project. The federal
government offered Duncanville $199,950 as the property's fair market value. Duncanville argued that
it should receive $1,276,000, representing the cost of developing a new landfill, because "its responsibility for municipal garbage disposal.., compelled the city to arrange for a suitable replacement facility or
substitute garbage disposal service." Id. at 34. The Court disagreed and refused to award replacement
value. Id.; see also Antoine v. United States, 710 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1983) (refusing to award replacement value for property improperly taken from the plaintiffs great-grandfather in the Rosebud Sioux
Tribe); cf Schill, supra note 5, at 889 (arguing courts should adopt replacement value as compensation
for intergovernmental takings).
125 For example, valuing takings of real property may be particularly difficult because there is often
no ready market for the property. Courts may admit or exclude evidence of comparable sales depending
on whether an identifiable sale really was of comparable property. Such evidentiary rulings can have a
profound effect on the valuation evidence a jury will be allowed to hear. Likewise, decisions about
whether to exclude valuation evidence including unaccepted offers for the burdened property, or the
original sales price, may limit or expand compensation depending on the substance of the evidence.
Other valuation mechanisms that could be included in subsequent work include: assemblage, see Franc
v. Bethel Holding Co., 807 A.2d 519, 527 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); separately valuing land and improvements, see United States v. Merz, 376 U.S. 192, 196 (1964); valuing the subsequent enlargement of a
public project, see United States v. W. G. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 17-18 (1970); and severance damages,
see supranotes 47, 49 (considering awards of consequential and severance damages).
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decisions that have the greatest impact on valuation decisions, and therefore
roughly sketches the outer boundaries of compensation.
These mechanisms should not be understood as raising or lowering just
compensation from some objective or correct fair market value.' 26 Instead,
they highlight that compensation necessarily includes a host of background
decisions that influence the size of awards. These decisions cannot be
ducked. Awarding harm or gain, allocating risk, deciding on the timing of
the compensation, identifying background regulations, and benefits to the
property owner are not "add-ons" or substitutes to fair market value but are
part of any fair market value determination.
II. CONTESTED TAKINGS THEORIES

The previous Part explored the range of valuation decisions affecting
compensation for takings claims. At first glance, this might seem like yet
one more place where current takings doctrine has failed to develop principled bases for decisionmaking. Indeed, most courts employ these valuation
mechanisms reactively and without any apparent awareness of the relationship between their valuation decisions and broader theoretical considerations.' 27 But the compensation question does provide an opportunity for
increased consistency. By aligning their underlying goals with appropriate
valuation mechanisms, courts can use compensation to advance substantive
interests, and at least ensure that valuation decisions are not at odds with the
results they are trying to achieve.
If this prescription sounds abstract, it is partly because the underlying
goals of the Takings Clause are so contested. Scholars in the field have developed competing theories of the Takings Clause, each with its own implications for distinguishing between permissible and impermissible
government regulations. After presenting the central insights of the most
important of these different accounts, this Part develops a new taxonomy of
the most prominent takings theories. Instead of categorizing them by their
prescriptions for when compensation is due-the by-now well-framed takings battleground-this taxonomy focuses on the approach to compensation
best suited to each theory's substantive goals. In other words, this Part
seeks to move the inquiry beyond the question of when compensation is due
and to examine what valuation mechanisms from Part I are best suited to
achieving each takings theory's particular goals.
126 This is not to suggest that the fair market value of certain fungible property
cannot be measured
with great accuracy. Real property often has a specific market value in an area that can be readily identified, and in many cases such a value will be unquestioningly adopted by the court and by the parties
themselves. But even in the heartland of fair market value determinations, at least some of the valuation
mechanisms described in Part L.B apply and demonstrate that compensation is subject to a court's definition of the property at issue, the timing of the valuation, the purpose of the regulation, and offsetting
benefits or encumbrances that should be included in determining the ultimate award.
127 Courts have almost universally failed to theorize
in a sophisticated way about compensation.
For just a few examples of such unreflective decisions, see supra text accompanying notes 30-38.
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Preliminarily, this Part analyzes the traditional economic justification
for the Takings Clause with its goal of preventing fiscal illusion. Currently,
the most forceful criticism of "inadequate" compensation points to its failure to force government to internalize the costs of its actions when less than
28 This traditional economic account does
full compensation is awarded.
not, however, stand on its own as a prescription for takings jurisprudence
because it fails to provide any principled basis for distinguishing those
regulations requiring compensation from those that do not. The traditional
economic account is nevertheless important to explore because its basic insight that forcing the government to pay will influence its appetite for regulation carries over into other, richer conceptions of the Takings Clause.
After analyzing the traditional economic account, Part II classifies the
leading takings theories in terms of their broader compensatory goals. This
is uncharted territory in the takings literature. Classifying takings theories
in this way suggests how remedies can be mapped on to core constitutional
values. The valuation mechanisms described in this Article provide the
means to operationalize that connection. Finally, this Part concludes by
analyzing current criticisms of the traditional economic account and their
implications for the compensation analysis.
A. Fiscal Illusion and the TraditionalEconomic Model
In current scholarship, the intuition favoring a "make whole" principle
goal
in just compensation is based primarily upon the traditional economic
2 9 This
of forcing the government to internalize the costs of its actions."
straightforward economic account suggests that requiring the government to
pay will prevent fiscal illusion. Ideally, compensation forces the government to compare the costs of its actions with the anticipated benefits,

The Supreme Court has often identified full indemnification as the goal of just compensation.
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See Brown v. Legal Found., 538 U.S. 216, 236 (2003); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,
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thereby creating incentives for the government to undertake only efficient
actions, i.e., those that create more benefits than compensable costs. 3 °
The insight is familiar and easily captured in a simple example. Assume that building a park will impose a cost of $100 to a private landowner
(perhaps in land acquisition), and create a gain of $75 to the public (perhaps
in increased property values or in more abstract enjoyment of the property),
resulting in a net harm of $25. If the government does not have to pay to
acquire the property, it may value the park only in terms of the benefit it
would produce and is therefore more likely to undertake an inefficient project. If the government is forced to compensate the property owner, however, then it must internalize the cost of the park, forcing the government to
evaluate its overall net benefit.
Any discrepancy between the costs imposed by a government action
and the amount of compensation due for takings creates an opportunity for
the government to undertake inefficient projects. Thus, in order to prevent
fiscal illusion, the government must be forced to compensate for all harms
inflicted by its action. In the example above, if only $60 of the $100 cost
imposed by the park is compensable, voters may still approve the (inefficient) park, even if they collectively value it at $75. While there may be
countervailing concerns in the form of administrative costs, under an ideal,
albeit highly theoretical, incentive-based theory, the only way to ensure that
the government will internalize the true costs of its actions is to require
compensation for every governmental action based on a full measure of the
property owner's harms.'
While the traditional economic account has general theoretical appeal-and remains ubiquitous in the takings literature-it does not stand on
its own as an independent goal for takings jurisprudence. Virtually every
government action benefits some people and harms others, but we do not
usually require the winners to compensate the losers in the legislative process. The government would come to a standstill if required to compensate

Merrill, supra note 26, at 131; see also Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 18, at 620 ("In a truly
efficient system, decisionmaking bodies must account for the full social costs of their actions.
Budgetary
outlays should not, in principle, affect the public decision any more than other social costs.
However,
decisions are often skewed by attempts to avoid monetary expenditures which appear
in the budget.
Therefore, it is important to consider the possibility that a change in the compensation rule
will alter the
outcome of the regulatory process."). There are two primary critiques of this account, even
on its own
terms. The first comes from public choice theory, and is discussed in greater detail, infra text
accompanying notes 221-237. The second comes from Daryl Levinson's recent article challenging
the asymmetrical assumption that governments automatically internalize the benefits of their actions,
but only
internalize their costs if they are forced to pay compensation. See generally Daryl J. Levinson,
Making
Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI.
L. REv. 345
(2000). For purposes of the present discussion, I will focus only on the traditional economic
account
and return to these critiques in Part II.E.
131 EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 94.
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for every harm it imposed. 32 Unconstitutional takings, in other words, are
relatively rare compared to the number of actions governments undertake.
Distinguishing governmental actions requiring compensation from those
that do not is the central puzzle of the Takings Clause. The traditional economic account, whatever its merits, does not provide an answer to this
seemingly intractable problem.
Doctrinally, too, the Supreme Court has frequently rejected efforts to
force the government to bear the full costs of its actions, excluding broad
categories of harms from compensation awards, such as consequential damages and lost profits.'33 Instead of suggesting that the exclusion of certain
categories of harms means current compensation practices are inadequate,
these cases are more productively read to suggest that the Supreme Court
has at least implicitly rejected the traditional economic account as an inde34 Leading commentators have also
pendent goal of the Takings Clause.'
pointed out that the demands of economic efficiency are so far removed
in exclufrom existing takings doctrine that viewing the Takings Clause
35
exercise.'
academic
an
remain
should
terms
economic
sively
Forcing the government to internalize the costs of its actions is, by itself, too thin an account of the Takings Clause to be prescriptively useful.
Nevertheless, the normatively richer takings theories discussed in the remainder of this Part rely on its central insight that forcing the government to
pay compensation will have some effect on the government's appetite to act
in the first place.'36 This observation is not intended to lump all of the folbetween
lowing discussions on one side of the broad and familiar division
37 In fact,
Clause.'
Takings
the
of
conceptions
economic and fairness-based
132 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("Government hardly could go on if to
some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in
the general law."). As Radin has succinctly explained, "The [Takings] issue is pervasive because almost
all government actions make some entitlement holders worse off relative to others, yet government
could not exist if it were required to undo all of its own actions by compensating everyone adversely affected by any action with distributive effects." RADIN, supra note 20, at 146.
133 E.g., United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 33 (1985) (excluding consequential damages); United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 514 (1979) (excluding non-transferable val-

ues from just compensation).
134 But see Burney, supra note 4, at 793 (suggesting that fair market value represents nothing more
than the practical need for a workable rule).
135 See Hermalin, supra note 45, at 72 ("[T]he first-best outcome can be achieved by using the
compensation rule in which the citizen retains her property only if she pays the state."); Jed Rubenfeld,
Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1131 (1993) ("[E]conomic analysis would call for a 'rather fundamental
overhaul' of established practice. Despite its popularity in a certain scholarly marketplace, this overhaul
of compensation law ought to remain an exclusively academic exercise." (citation omitted)); see also
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 69 (1977).
136 Although this assumption has been problematized in recent literature, see infra Part ILE, it re-

tains its powerful grip on takings literature. See, e.g., Heller & Krier, supra note 18, at 1004.
137 E.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 135, at 1131-39 (describing different currents in takings scholarship
generally); see also Levinson, supra note 129, at 388 (refining this distinction further to separate the
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this Part avoids such categorization, focusing rather on what each theory
prescribes for compensation. The resulting taxonomy intentionally departs
from the more common categories found in existing literature, grouping
takings theories based on their requirements for high compensation, low
compensation, or context-dependent compensation.
B.

Theories RequiringHigh Compensation

1. Hostility to Government Regulations.-While much of the current
takings debate focuses on legal and doctrinal property issues, it is hard to
ignore the political subtext underlying many of the arguments on both
sides.' 38 The stakes are high and the political implications relatively
straightforward. Simply put, advocates of a circumscribed role for government generally favor aggressively identifying regulations as unconstitutional takings for which compensation is due.'39 Forcing the government to
pay, they argue, will make government action more expensive and limit the
extent of the government's encroachment on private property. This attitude
toward the government is consistent with a preference for the market over
political solutions. In particular, deterring governmental action will favor
market transfers of property rights over legislated transfers.'40
There are many reasons, including the idiosyncratic, for aversion to
governmental interference with private property. Most of the theoretical
reasons found in the academic literature focus on pessimistic theories of
legislation. For example, under the most cynical version of the public
choice theorists' description of the legislative process, governmental actions
are often nothing more than a vehicle for rent-seeking from motivated speeconomic accounts into those that focus on government incentives and those that focus on property
owner incentives).
138 E.g., Lunney, supra note 1, at 769 ("Ultimately, the choice between
a more, or less, generous
standard of compensation, like the choice between a broader, or narrower, scope to the issue of whether
a taking has occurred, will depend on the extent to which one trusts the legislature to distribute the benefits and burdens of civilized society in an even and fair manner.").
139 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Whose Democratic Vision of the
Takings Clause? A Comment on
FrankMichelman's Testimony on Senate Bill 605, 49 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 17, 23 (1996)
("The sole judicial constraint, one that says 'take and pay,' beats a world of just plain 'take."'). Politically, this view is consistent with current libertarian attitudes toward private property. See Hanoch Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens, and Injurious Industries, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 409-10
(2000) ("The libertarian conception of property focuses on shielding the individual from claims of other
persons and from the power of the public authority and preserving an untouchable private sphere, which
is a prerequisite to personal development and autonomy."); see also Bamhizer, supra note 49, at 301
("[Tihe advocates of a tough takings doctrine believe in a package of values that elevate the right of the
individual to compete in a competitive free-market economy and reward successful competitors for the
contribution made by their individual skills.").
140 See, e.g., Dagan & White, supra note 139, at
408; see also Barnhizer, supra note 49, at 301 ("It
is not a reach to suggest that the advocates of a tough takings doctrine believe in a package of values that
elevate the right of the individual to compete in a competitive free market economy and reward successful competitors for the contribution made by their individual skills.").
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cial interest groups.' 41 Whatever its underlying basis, though, hostility to
government interference with property rights has predictable implications
for compensation: regulating should be made as expensive as possible for
the government. Increasing the cost to the government of burdening private
property will systematically reduce the government's appetite for acting in
the first place.' 2 Although this theory and the traditional economic account
share an insight about the incentive effect of making the government pay, it
provides its own specific goal: limiting the amount of regulation generally,
instead of creating nuanced incentives for economically efficient levels of
regulation.
From this perspective, the central purpose of the Takings Clause is to
shift the balance of public and private rights to the property owner. Of
fullest measure of procourse, a property rule, when available, provides the
43
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A monetary award that functions to deter governmental action will best
protect property owners' right to bargain with the government; it serves as
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See Steven Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98

COLUM. L. REv. 1, 35-41 (1998) (citing sources).
142 E.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS
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Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1391 (1993) ("[T]he
Takings Clause ... will serve as a welcome restraint on the appetite of government.").
143 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2099 (1997)
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144 See Epstein, supra note 139, at 18-19 ("The very acceptance of the power of the government to
of the
take property with just compensation is, without more, conclusive evidence that a sensible version
property rights movement does not move toward any absolute conception of property.").
145 Moreover, since FirstEnglish Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304 (1987), damages are often awarded in addition to striking down a regulation and providing property
are reserved for
rule protection. Such "temporary takings" present unique challenges to valuation and
another day.
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an ex post award approximating an ex ante property rule.'46 This amounts to
a kind of systemic property rule, minimizing on a large scale the government's incentive to regulate in the first place. Indeed, the proof of this effect is the common objection that too strong a takings regime will overdeter governmental action.'47 If the goal is to make it more expensive for
the government to infringe on private property, this not only means finding
more actions be to takings but also compensating more for them.
Among the valuation mechanisms identified in Part I, there are four
compensation mechanisms available to courts that will advance this goal.
The first is simply to shift a greater portion of litigation expenses to the
government.'48 Although this award is not supercompensatory from the
property owner's perspective, adding significant litigation expenses increases the potential costs associated with any regulation beyond the value
of the regulated property and will diminish the government's willingness to
risk taking property.
Second is to provide the fullest possible recovery for condemnation
blight, or its regulatory equivalent."' Compensating for all loss in value resulting from the mere contemplation of a government action effectively creates a zero tolerance baseline for government regulation of private property.
Although recreating some ideal pre-regulatory, pure laissez faire market
condition may be an entirely theoretical exercise, because no such market
ever existed, attempting such a re-creation shifts the full impact of the regulatory state back to the government. It is also interesting to note that courts
explicitly compensating for condemnation blight usually do so only after
finding that the government acted in bad faith.'5 °
The third appropriate valuation mechanism is to place all development
risks onto the government when computing property's highest and best
use.' 5' This is particularly well-suited to deterring government actions, be146 See Dagan, supra note 14, at 15; Richard Craswell, Instrumental
Theories of Compensation: A
Survey, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1135, 1144, 1173 (2003) ("[D]amages in a regime of property rules are
designed for deterrence rather than for compensation: They are designed to deter the wrongdoer from
taking someone else's property without first securing the property holder's consent.").
147 See, e.g., Courtney Harrington, Penn Central
to Palozzolo: Regulatory Takings Decisions and
Their Implicationsfor EnvironmentalRegulation, 15 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 383, 397 (2002) (criticizing recent Supreme Court cases on grounds they deter environmental regulation); cf Ann E. Carlson & Daniel
Pollak, Takings on the Ground: How the Supreme Court's Takings JurisprudenceAffects Local
Land

Use Decisions, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 103, 116 (2001) (finding that vast majority of city and town planners in California were aware of important takings cases); John D. Echeverria, A Turning of the Tide:
The Tahoe-Sierra Regulatory Takings Decision, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11235, 11240 (2002) (describing the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Tahoe-Sierraas endorsing land use planning and regulation).
148 See supra Part I.B.6.
149 See supra Part I.B.5.
150 E.g., Klopping v. City of Whittier, 500 P.2d 1345, 1349-50 (Cal. 1972)
(requiring compensation
for damage resulting from precondemnation announcements when the condemnor acts unreasonably by
excessively delaying eminent domain action or by other oppressive conduct).
151 See supra Part I.B.2.
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cause shifting all risk to the government implicitly encourages the government to try the market before resorting to its regulatory power. 52 A real
buyer in the market would be able to negotiate the allocation of risks between buyer and seller; this damage award simply allocates all of those
risks to the government.'53
Finally, where the government is taking property to create or facilitate
a new commercial enterprise, forcing the government to disgorge its antici54
pated gain from the regulation will also deter the government from acting.'
Like allocating risks to the government, valuing a regulation by the benefit
to the government will generally make the government better off acting in
the open market and negotiating for some division of a new enterprise's anticipated gain with the present owner than if it had to repay the full benefit
of the new enterprise.'55 This will only be untrue when the government's
non-commodifiable gains are higher still.
2.

Just Compensation as Just Deserts.-A deserts-based takings the-

ory is not represented in current takings scholarship. Nevertheless, some
readers might object that the discussion so far has ignored the intuition that
property owners have some independent right to the "full" value of their
property, independent of any incentive-based theory. The intuitive appeal
of this suggestion is only superficial.
152 There are, obviously, reasons why the government cannot act like any other private purchaser.
See, e.g., William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Just Compensation, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 23, 40 (1996) (describing the economically perverse incentive effect created when owners know
in advance that their property will be taken); Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1558 (1999)
(describing government's bilateral monopoly problem). These, however, are reasons to not adopt an
anti-regulation perspective in certain situations, and do not undermine the theoretical basis for this
valuation award.
153 This has an interesting side effect of diminishing the moral hazard problem that normally accompanies a robust takings regime. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 129, at 389 ("Developer must decide
whether to invest $1 million in building an office tower on her land. At the time of her decision, the city
council is debating whether to route a new highway through Developer's land or through a neighboring
parcel .... If Developer knows she will be fully compensated for the value of the office tower in the
event her land is taken... she will not discount the benefits of the building project by the probability of
the taking."). Expanding upon Levinson's example, if that property is taken after the developer builds
milher project, the government will have to pay the full $1 million. The developer's profits will be $1
costs
development
where
$250,000,
(e.g.,
development
the
in
invested
lion minus the expenses already
were $750,000). However, if the government takes the property before the project is built, the government will now only have to pay $250,000 under the highest and best use standard. The developer will
actually prefer the latter award because she will not have had to take the risks associated with actually
developing the property. Her interests, then, may once again align with the government's, as the government will also prefer to take undeveloped property.
154 See DAGAN, supra note 14, at 18 (explaining, in the restitutionary context, that an award based
on the defendant's gain protects the plaintiff's control over her resource because it removes the defendant's incentive to expropriate the resource).
155 This may also be expressed as an award based on the higher of the owner's harm or the government's gain, creating a strong disincentive to regulate. See DAGAN, supra note 14, at 21; Heller &
Serkin, supranote 14, at 1390 & n.11.
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For better or worse, property theory has come a long way from Blackstone's conception of private ownership as that "sole and despotic dominion" over property.'56 Historically, there is evidence that even the
constitutional framers did not share an absolutist conception of property.'57
The phrase "just compensation" differs noticeably from the earliest compensation clauses in this country, which provided for payment of "an
equivalent in money,"'58 and "full compensation,"' 59 following more closely
'
the Massachusetts approach of requiring "reasonable compensation." 160
In the modem state, there is no real doubt that private ownership is
subject to at least some measure of governmental regulation, and sometimes
even limited, non-consensual public use. Owning property does not automatically include the right to store hazardous waste, 6' or to exclude strangers during a storm.'62 It also does not include the right to resist government
takings of the property, so long as the government pays just compensation.
To suggest that a property owner is necessarily entitled to full indemnification for all of her losses in the event of a taking is, in some sense, to assume
away this insight and to revert to an absolutist conception of property.
While individuals may indeed feel compensation for takings is inadequate,
this is no different from other areas of law that fail to indemnify fully injured parties.'63 In short, some additional normative account is required to
156 See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *2 (Cavendish
Publ'g 2001) (1765-1769).
157See Treanor, supra note 19, at 824 ("[E]arly
compensation practices reflect a distinctly republican attitude towards property. It was a state creation and its scope was appropriately set by the state.").
158 See id. at 829 (quoting the Vermont
State Constitution).
159See id. at 831 (quoting the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787).
160See id. at 830. Louisiana's constitution provides
a similar example from the other direction. In
1921, Louisiana amended its compensation requirement which had provided a property owner "just and
adequate compensation" to provide compensation "to the full extent of his loss." See Tracy Lee Howard, Compensatingan Owner to the Full Extent of His Loss: A Reevaluation of Compensable Damages
in LouisianaExpropriation Cases, 51 LA. L. REV. 821, 821 (1991).
161 See 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (2003).
162 See Ploofv. Putnam, 71 A. 188,
189 (Vt. 1908).
163See C. Boone Schwartzel, Is the Prudent
Investor Rule Good for Texas?, 54 BAYLOR L. REV.
701, 838 (2002) ("In most other areas of the law, states continue to measure consequential damages
by
interest and do not allow the recovery of lost profits even though as a result plaintiffs arguably are not
thereby fully compensated for their losses."); Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1523, 1542 (1984) ("An injury often has aspects that are difficult to prove, as when property with sentimental value is destroyed or a business venture is disrupted before it becomes profitable. Proof is so
difficult with subjective and speculative injuries that they are often excluded from damages, causing a
bias toward undercompensation."); Richard Craswell, ContractRemedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S.CAL. L. REV. 629, 637 (1988) ("[E]xpectation damages as awarded in law
often fall short of a truly compensatory measure due to the exclusion of such items as attorneys' fees,
unmeasurable subjective losses, and 'unforeseeable' damages."); Gil Lahav, A Principle of Justified
Promise-Breakingand Its Application to Contract Law, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 163, 187 n.62
(2000) (citing sources); see also STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
243 (2004) (comparing international treatment of nonpecuniary losses).
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justify an entitlement to full indemnification."
C. Theories Requiring Low Compensation
1. Deference to Government Regulations.-On the flip side of hostility to government is a more optimistic model of legislation. Civic republicanism, for example, suggests that legislators are able to rise above the
political pressure presented by rent-seeking special interest groups and to
legislate based on their views of the public good.'65 Faith in the government's good intentions and ability to legislate in the public's best interest
are consistent with accepting legislative solutions to issues like environmental protection, zoning, and other public concerns impacting private
property.'66 This approach does not eliminate the need for a takings doctrine. The government can make good faith efforts to secure the public interest and nevertheless impose an undue burden on a particular property
owner that requires compensation. Still, this conception of government directly affects how the Takings Clause should be interpreted.
Unlike libertarians or public choice theorists who seek to limit governmental interference with private property, the civic republican view of
legislative decisionmaking seeks to clear a wider space for legislative solutions to public problems. Lower compensation for takings will reduce the
economic risk of legislating.'67 This does not imply that legislation is valuable in itself: more legislation is not necessarily better. However, confidence that the government is subject to internal constraints preventing
legislative abuses requires minimizing the risk of over-deterring desirable
legislation by awarding relatively less compensation for takings.
There are several valuation mechanisms consistent with this attitude
toward regulation. The broader the government's power to regulate, the
more conditions there are that attach to private ownership. In other words,
underlying a deferential stance toward the government's power to regulate
are implicit limitations on private ownership. Moreover, as property rights
are protected and, in a sense, conferred by the government, the government
164 See Craswell, supra note 146, at 1137 ("[lf compensation consists of restoring the victim to
some position he had a right to occupy, a substantive theory of rights is needed to define the baseline
position."); cf id. at 1178 ("The goal of compensation may tell us to restore the value of that which is
lost, or something along those lines, but possible measures of 'value' are a dime a dozen. And as long
as compensation is taken as a brute premise of corrective justice, there is no further goal behind that
premise to which we can look for a more specific answer.").
165 E.g., Croley, supra note 141, at 78 ("[T]he theory contemplates that [participants in regulatory
decision making] exhibit a certain amount of public-spiritedness.").
166 See supra note 147.
167 See Heller & Krier, supra note 18, at 999 ("If the government were free to take resources without paying for them, it would not feel incentives, created by the price system, to use those resources efficiently. A likely consequence would be the movement of some resources from higher to lower valued
uses.").
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may not need to pay as much as a private party to reacquire them. 6 Aggressively identifying permissible but unenacted regulations that attach to
property as background encumbrances appropriately reduces the overall
compensation for takings due to property owners.' 69 Similarly, choosing a
valuation date that post-dates some condemnation blight takes into account
the government's background right to impose at least a certain level of
regulation without paying compensation. 71 0
Because these valuation mechanisms can sometimes be difficult to apply in practice, deference to the government can also be expressed through
partial compensation as a proxy for the property's value offset by regulations that the government could legitimately have imposed but did not. Although partial compensation is never expressly authorized as an award,
computing the highest and best use by allocating all of the risks of devel-

opment to the property owner achieves the same goal.'
Awarding the lower of either a harm or gain-based award also amounts
to a form of partial compensation.'
This would limit compensation to the
owner's harm when the governmental action has created a large benefit, or,
more commonly, limit compensation to the government's gain when the
property had some added value to the owner that is not reflected in the market price. Depending on the factual situation, then, limiting a property
owner's recovery to the value of the property to the government can represent a deferential attitude toward the governmental action.
2. Insurance Theory.-In addition to creating legislative incentives,
just compensation has an effect on property owners' investment incentives.'73 A conception of the Takings Clause as a form of public insurance
against governmental actions is primarily concerned with these incentives.
In their important contribution to the field, Blume and Rubinfeld have
pointed out that an improperly calibrated takings regime risks creating a
moral hazard problem and inefficient overinvestment.' If property owners

168 In describing early compensation practices, under state constitutions, William Treanor notes:
"[Property] was a state creation and its scope was appropriately set by the state." Treanor, supra note
19, at 824.
169 See supra Part 1.B.3.
170 See supra Part I.B.5.
171See supra Part I.B.2.
172 This is closely analogous to valuing restitution by the lower of the plaintiffs harm
or the defendant's gain. See DAGAN, supra note 14, at 21. This has the effect of encouraging expropriation or, in
the present context, of encouraging governmental regulation. See Heller & Serkin, supra note 14, at
1407-08.
173 See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 18, at 618-19; Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice
and Just
Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 285 (1992) ("Government compensation for takings creates a
potentially serious moral hazard problem of its own."); see also ACKERMAN, supra note 135, at 45.
174 See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 18, at 590-92; see also Eric
Kades, Avoiding Takings "Accidents ": A Tort Perspective on Takings Law, 28 U. RICH. L. REv. 1235 (1994). This insight has more
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expect to receive full indemnification in the event their property is taken,
then they will improperly ignore the risk of governmental action, even
where a particular action can be reasonably anticipated.'75 Something less
than full indemnification is therefore necessary to eliminate or reduce moral
hazard. 76 This same principle explains why private insurance usually requires an insured to pay a deductible in the event of loss.' 77
Of course, compensation that is too low will create inefficient incen178
tives for property owners to underinvest in their property. The amount of
compensation necessary to create efficient investment incentives depends
on the risk aversion of the affected property owner: the more risk averse
the property owner is, the higher the expected compensation will have to be
to prevent underinvestment. 179 A properly calibrated insurance regime will
force a property owner to internalize at least some of the risk of a detrimental regulation so that she will not overinvest in her property, but it will also

traction than it might seem. Threats of governmental action can have a dramatic effect of property values and, therefore, investment decisions. See generally Kanner, supra note 5.
175 See Dagan & White, supra note 139, at 408; see also Kaplow, supra note 100, at 531 ("It is socially desirable for investors to take into account the prospects for government reform; compensation
eliminates this incentive by insulating investors from an important element of downside risk."). Levinson provides a simple demonstration of this principle:
Suppose that Developer is choosing between two sites for construction of an office building, north
and south. If Developer builds on the north parcel of land, the completed building will be worth
$1 million; if she builds on the south parcel, which costs exactly the same amount as the north parcel, the building will be worth $2.2 million. Developer knows that there is a 50 percent chance
that, after construction of the building has been completed, government will rezone or impose an
environmental regulation on the south parcel such that the building, if located there, would be rendered worthless. There is no chance that the government will rezone or regulate the north parcel.
If Developer is risk neutral, she will choose to develop the south parcel, for the expected value of
the building there (0.5 x $2.2 million + 0.5 x $0 = $1.1 million) is greater than the certain value of
the building on the north parcel ($1 million). If Developer is risk averse, however, she will discount the expected value of building on the south parcel by some risk premium. If this premium
exceeds $100,000, Developer will choose to develop the north parcel instead.
Levinson, supranote 130, at 391.
176 See Dagan, supra note 5, at 749 ("Efficiency requires that every investor take into account the
prospects of real risks, including the risk that the value of an investment may be destroyed or reduced by
a new public need. Hence, when there is uncertainty about the government's needs, a full-compensation
rule provides incentives for excessive private investment, including improvements that will be of no use
in the event that the land in question is subjected to public use."); see also Craswell, supra note 146, at
1154 (describing moral hazard problem).
177 See, e.g., Kades, supra note 174, at 1245; George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and
Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1548 (1987) ("[M]arket insurance universally incorporates deductibles and coinsurance where the extent of the loss can be influenced by insureds' ex ante or ex post
decisions.").
178 Joseph W. Trefzger, Efficient Compensationfor Regulatory Takings: Some Thoughts Following
the Lucas Ruling, 23 REAL EST. L.J. 191, 194 (1995).
179 Farber, supra note 173, at 283 (suggesting that compensation should track the risk aversion of
property owners).
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insure her against losses that are so substantial that they would deter effi80
cient investments.
From the perspective of an insurance-based takings theory, property
owners should be compensated for their loss minus a deductible designed to
force them to internalize some of the risk of regulatory action. Preliminarily, the blanket prohibition against awarding consequential damages automatically builds some risk internalization into all compensation regimes. 8'
But takings law can operate more efficiently as a form of insurance if it is
calibrated, at least in some measure, to the risk aversion of property owners.'82 An individual homeowner may sufficiently internalize the risks of
governmental regulation if consequential and subjective damages are excluded. She is unlikely, for example, to discount inefficiently the risk of
governmental regulation when deciding when and where to add on to her
house because of the non-compensable damages she would nevertheless
suffer in the event of a taking.'83 A less risk-averse corporation or developer, on the other hand, may need to internalize more of the risks of development in order to prevent inefficient overinvestment. In fact, in some
situations, zero compensation would be appropriate to force the developer
to internalize the risk of government action sufficiently to prevent moral
hazard. 4 This would be synonymous with a finding of no taking at all.
180 Taking the traditional economic model at face value, compensation calibrated to create efficient
legislative incentives may conflict with compensation necessary to create efficient investment incentives. See Merrill, supra note 26, at 132 ("[R]equiring the government fully to internalize all costs of
takings would provide no incentives to property owners, but requiring property owners fully to internalize the costs of using their property in ways inconsistent with future government takings (that is, denying all compensation) would provide no incentive to the government.").
18l See Epstein, supra note 139, at 19 ("1 have heard too many stories of individuals who have
been
wiped out when their property has been taken with payment of compensation that is anything but just:
no compensation for appraisal fees, litigation expenses, lost good will, moving expenses, anticipated renewal rights, and so on. The absolutist position guards against these risks which now routinely form a
part of property ownership in the United States. And any rule that has that beneficial consequence cannot be all bad."); see also Merrill, supra note 26, at Il1 (observing that "just compensation means incomplete compensation" because it ignores consequential and other damages).
182 See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 18, at 601-03 (describing the efficient
relationship between
risk-aversion and insurance payments).
183 It should be noted, however, that homeowners' insistence on rebuilding
in flood plains, despite
the absence of compensation for subjective harm, might provide empirical evidence to refute this claim.
See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Coalitions and Quakes: Disaster Relief and Its Prevention, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 1, 7-8 (1996). However, it is also possible that those particular property owners would
suffer even higher subjective harm from building in a new location. Without more information about
their motivations, the challenge posed by this counterexample is not insurmountable.
184 Levinson has suggested that an insurance theory of takings should
endorse paying compensation
"only to the class of risk-averse property owners." Levinson, supra note 130, at 392. This would
amount to charging the full value of the loss, i.e., not paying compensation at all, for property owners
who are not risk averse. Others have suggested a more broadly applicable "zero compensation" rule.
See Kaplow, supra note 100, at 536-50 (arguing that state compensation should be eliminated in favor
of private insurance that only risk averse property owners would be likely to purchase).
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An appropriate valuation mechanism to advance insurance-based concerns will decrease compensation proportionately with the risk aversion of
the property owner. While risk aversion may not be possible to measure directly,' 85 economists agree that, in general, it varies proportionately with
wealth.'86 Therefore, compensation under this approach should decrease as
the wealth of the property owner increases.
87
None of the valuation mechanisms accomplish this directly,' but a
flexible application of the benefit-offset test becomes an appropriate valuation mechanism to advance an insurance-based regime if the benefits a
court will consider expand as the wealth-and, hence, risk neutrality--of
the property owner increases. Even an inflexible application of a benefitoffset test that includes as a benefit the ability to extract long-term concessions from the government will approximate this result because these more
88 Including a greater
abstract benefits will often correlate with wealth.'
range of offsetting benefits when regulations burden the wealthy will fur89
ther limit their compensation, to the point of a zero compensation award.'
There is no doubt that the benefit-offset rule, as courts apply it today, is
to track wealth, let alone risk aversion, with any precision. But it
blunt
too
the right direction. It will decrease compensation by the propin
operates
erty owner's long-term or abstract benefits from the government which, in
turn, tend to increase proportionately with wealth. The end result: a valua185 See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 18, at 603 ("Measurement of the degree of risk aversion is a

methodologically difficult and controversial subject. In fact, there is no general measure of risk aversion
which economists find satisfactory for describing individual attitudes toward risk and insurance.").
186 "The general view held by economists is that absolute risk aversion declines with wealth." Id. at
604; see also Daniel Farber, Economic Analysis andJust Compensation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 125,
127 (1992) ("[T]he wealthy should be less willing to insure against losses of the same size than the poor,
since a smaller portion of their total wealth is at risk."). While there are additional measures of risk
aversion, see Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 18, at 603, this Article will focus on the most straightforward: absolute risk aversion.
187 Hanoch Dagan has suggested provocatively that the traditional diminution of value test will
achieve this result, but only with the blunt instrument of determining whether a taking has occurred. See
Dagan, supra note 5, at 781-85. In other words, the diminution of value test he proposes can only determine whether someone receives compensation and not how much compensation she should receive.
188 See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 5, at 159 n.7. This is not a perfect correlation. As Dagan acknowledges, there is a strong argument to be made that small property owners are actually more politically powerful than large developers and big landowners who "tend to be politically weak, because their
'constituents' are non-resident home-buyers who do not vote in municipal elections." Dagan, supra note
129, at 137 n.8 (citing the views of Professor Roderick Hills); see also Farber, supra note 186, at 130.
While Hills's proposal of an inverse relationship between power and wealth may well apply in certain
situations, in the paradigmatic and most frequent land-use planning decisions, and other regulations,
power and wealth are directly correlated.
189 Saul Levmore has proposed a similar analysis for determining when a taking has occurred. He
argues that where regulatory burdens are placed on groups able to extract long-term concessions from
the government then they are not takings. See Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics,22
CONN. L. REV. 285, 311-12 (1990). His useful analysis can be further refined, however, by inserting an
element of compensation. See also Dagan, supra note 5, at 771-78 (providing a sophisticated account
of reciprocity of advantage).
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tion mechanism that decreases compensation as the wealth of the burdened
property owner increases.
D. Theories Requiring Context-DependentCompensation
1. Redistributive Approaches to Just Compensation.-Propertyis not
just a status conferred on certain rights and things but also exists in a social
space, creating relative levels of wealth in society. How the government
protects private property has corresponding consequences for the distribution of wealth. Rigid protection of existing property rights prioritizes the
status quo. Permissive or more flexible conceptions of property allow for
greater redistribution. Some theorists have therefore focused on enforcement of the Takings Clause as a potential source for a progressive redistribution of property. 9 ° In fact, some historical evidence suggests that the
constitutional framers viewed property redistribution as a central function
of government and believed that the Takings Clause should not be interpreted to prevent such redistribution. 9 '
Many people have expressed an intuition, supported at least by anecdotal evidence, that governments are more likely to burden the relatively less
well off when choosing where, and on whom, to impose burdens created by
governmental action.192 Analogously, the environmental justice movement
suggests that people in poor neighborhoods are often forced to bear the
brunt of pollution.'9 3 The Takings Clause, and specifically approaches to
compensation, can provide a countervailing pressure. Although the best
way to achieve this goal remains contested in the literature, focusing on
compensation clarifies some aspects of the disagreement.
A progressive takings regime would provide more protection for property belonging to members of a disfavored group than to property belonging
190 See generally T. Nicolaus Tideman, Takings, Moral Evolution, and Justice, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1714 (1988); see also Leslie Bender, The Takings Clause: Principles or Politics?, 34 BUFFALO L. REV.

735, 816-29 (1985) (arguing the public use requirement should be interpreted to allow redistribution of
property from the rich to the poor); Dagan, supra note 5, at 787-88 ("[T]akings doctrine is not necessarily an inappropriate locus for egalitarian concerns. On the contrary... there is no obstacle to or fault in
allowing our distributive ideals to step in. In fact, their presence is even commendable."); cf STEPHEN
R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 421-22 (1990) ("[]f redistribution is sometimes legitimate, and if
takings can redistribute, then one cannot rule out certain takings simply on the footing that they aim to
redistribute income or wealth.").
191See Treanor, supra note 19, at 847 (describing James
Madison's understanding of the purpose of
the Takings Clause).
192 Heller & Krier, supra note 18, at 999 (arguing that the
Takings Clause can "constrain governmental inclinations to exploit politically vulnerable groups and individuals"); Saul Levmore, Takings,
Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1335 (1991); Levmore, supra note 189, at 306-07;
Treanor, supra note 19, at 873-74 (discussing environmental justice movement and citing sources).
193 Craig Anthony Arnold, Planning Milagros: Environmental
Justice and Land Use Regulation,
76 DENy. U. L. REV. 1 (1998); Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods:
Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383 (1994); see generally UNEQUAL
PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994).
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to the privileged. A separate normative account would be needed to explain
who belongs in each of these categories. But most likely, a progressive regime will favor those people with the least wealth and political power. In
order to provide greater protection for the politically and economically disadvantaged members of society, courts can make it less expensive for the
94
government to burden the private property of the wealthy and powerful.'
Under a redistributive approach, the same regulation or government action
that works a taking on a disadvantaged group would cost the government
more than when the burden is placed on an advantaged group. This would
create a countervailing pressure to offset the political influence of the
wealthy and powerful members of society who might otherwise seek to
shift burdens away from themselves.
This intuition, however, may not be so straightforward. Glynn Lunney, for one, has argued that decreasing compensation to the wealthy and
powerful might actually increase the vigor of their political opposition and
lead to increased burdens on the disadvantaged.' 95 Compensation could
96
have the perverse effect of staving off political opposition.' According to
Lunney, it is the politically powerful who need the highest compensation in
order97to dull their opposition to governmental interference with their property. 1

Contrary to Lunney's suggestion, it is unlikely as an empirical matter
that political opposition will increase meaningfully as compensation incrementally decreases. In other words, the relationship between political opposition and compensation is unlikely to be linear. Where the choice is
between full compensation and no compensation, Lunney might be right.
But adding a compensation dimension to Lunney's practical criticism undermines its persuasiveness. Property owners' opposition to a taking of
their property will be at or near 100% if compensation provides anything
less than full indemnification. In fact, it is more likely that opposition to a
government action would only decrease significantly with compensation
that included indemnification for subjective harms. A graph expresses two
possible relationships between compensation and political opposition:

194 See Dagan, supra note 5, at 788 ("[A] compensation regime that is not sensitive to the relative
political and economic power of the parties involved is both regressive and inefficient. Its inefficiency
(as well as its regressivity) derives from its allocational consequences, which, in turn, spring from the
incentives this regime generates for both public authorities and private landowners.").
195 See Lunney, supra note 5, at 165.
196 See FISCHEL, supranote I.
197 Lunney, supra note 5, at 165.
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Option I
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Option 21
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0
0
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If the only choices were between full compensation and no compensation-i.e., a taking or no taking-then political opposition would either exist or not, as Lunney suggests. But for Lunney's criticism to apply outside
of this binary world, opposition must be inversely related to compensation,
as illustrated by Option 2 above. The curve represented by Option 1, however, seems far more likely because of people's deep sense of entitlement
regarding their property.' 98 The Option 1 curve shows a steady and high
level of opposition up to a certain threshold level of compensation, at which
point opposition diminishes to near zero. While the degree of opposition is
inversely related to compensation at or near that threshold point, anything
short of full indemnification will yield the same or similar level of political
opposition. In other words, short of full indemnification, the property
owner will object as strenuously as if the government were offering no or
very limited compensation.
This might seem like an implausibly strong claim. Objecting to a governmental action includes its own costs and, at a certain point short of full
indemnification, it will cost a property owner more to object to a governmental action than to accept it and the inadequate compensation. There are
two competing factors at work, however. First, subjective damages may so
far outstrip any compensable damages so as to trivialize the difference between zero compensation and fair market value. Second, property owners
may object on principle to anything less than full indemnification. Although economically irrational, property ownership-especially real property ownership--comes with strong Blackstonian intuitions and property
owners may be willing to fight to the mat to prevent government encroachment on their property, even if it will cost them more in litigation expenses
than they could ever hope to recover as just compensation.
It would require additional empirical work to determine whether, and
under what conditions, these relationships between political opposition and
demoralization costs apply. Presumably, the relationship will depend on
the psychology of the particular property owner as well as the nature of the
198 Cf Carol Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121,
1143 (1996) ("There is just
something about land that makes you think that when you own it, it is really, really yours.").
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governmental action. But, at least in many instances, a property owner's
objection to a taking of her property will not respond to compensation for
the range of values representing less than full indemnification. Expanding
the range of compensation values from all or nothing calls into question
Lunney's assumptions about political opposition. Providing limited compensation to the wealthy and the powerful may not increase their opposition
to a governmental action. In the face of consistent political opposition,
making it more expensive to impose burdens on the politically disadvantaged would at least create some counterbalance to the political forces already at work.
The compensation that will best achieve this goal is awarding relatively lower compensation to the wealthy and politically powerful, and to
award relatively higher compensation to the poor and politically disadvantaged. Under this progressive approach, compensation is dependent upon a
contextual inquiry into the wealth and political power of the burdened property owner and a normative determination whether this is the kind of person
deserving greater protection. Assuming the progressive account is concerned primarily with redistributing wealth-or that wealth is at least an
adequate proxy for other progressive concerns-then, like the insurance rationale, a progressive takings theory demands compensation that varies inversely with the wealth of the property owner. Again, the benefit-offset test
approximates this result and is appropriate both here and under an insurance-based rationale.' 99
This is a surprising conclusion, but the possibility of a deep connection
between public takings insurance and distributive justice is not as outlandish as it may seem. Mandatory insurance regimes serve as a form of riskspreading that benefits people who are more risk-averse."' Critics of an insurance-based justification for takings note that many people would choose
to opt out, if given the opportunity."' This desire by the risk neutral to opt
out is precisely the source of the redistributive pressure; any compensation
regime under this view charges risk neutral property owners more than they
would choose to pay in order to offer protection to the risk-averse. Of
course, the redistributive pressures inherent in any mandatory governmental
insurance scheme are further increased when their pay-out depends on the
wealth of the insured.

199 See supra Part I.B.4; Part II.C.2.
200 See Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 516-17; cf Donald P. Judges, Of Rocks and HardPlaces: The
Value of Risk Choice, 42 EMORY L.J. 1, 125-26 (1993) (describing move towards mandatory insurance
as embodying redistributive principles); Stephen R. Perry, Comment on Coleman: CorrectiveJustice,
67 IND. L.J. 381, 397 (1992).
201 See Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 503 (describing the problem of adverse selection in insurance
theory); see also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L. REV. 277, 307
(2001) (assuming people would be required to purchase takings insurance for it to be functional).
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2. Personality Theory.-Whereas the previous approach entails an
inquiry into the political and economic status of the property owner, Margaret Jane Radin has advanced another non-incentive based account of the
Takings Clause that requires an inquiry into the type of property impacted.
Radin has argued that takings law should be responsive to a contextual inquiry into the personhood of the property taken. °2 There is no need to reprise the important and well-developed scholarship in this area except to
note Radin's suggestion that judicial enforcement of the Takings Clause
should acknowledge that some property "is normatively important to the
2 3
freedom, identity, and contextuality of people.""
Personality theory requires a compensation regime that is sensitive to whether the property impacted by a government action is entitled to heightened protection.2
Radin suggests a number of changes to existing takings law to accommodate this category of deeply personal property. Fair market value, she
suggests, is inherently inadequate to vindicate the personal connection people may have with this kind of property. 0 5 She thus proposes restricting the
government's power to condemn-or, perhaps, even to regulate-such
property. "[A] few objects may be so close to the personal end of the continuum that no compensation could be 'just.' That is, hypothetically, if
some object were so bound up with me that I would cease to be 'myself if
it were taken, then a government that must respect persons ought not to take
it."2" 6 In other words, she proposes substituting property rule protection for
the current regime of liability rule protection.
In light of Radin's account, fair market value seems like a particularly
inadequate measure of compensation for this class of deeply personal property. First, and most simply, to the extent that takings of deeply personal
property cause significant non-market based harms, a fair market value
standard will allow the government to escape internalizing these uncommodified costs. This feeds back into the traditional economic account and
suggests that legislative incentives will not be calibrated properly if the
government can impose these costs without having to pay for them.

202 See RADIN, supra note 20, at 146-65. In the chapter of her book discussing takings, Radin identifies cases in which courts appear responsive to the nature of the property taken. Id. at 154 & n.26. As
she succinctly argues: "Exactly what has been taken, and from whom, matters." Id. at 154.
203 Id. at 137. Radin also suggests that takings doctrine should be responsive to the nature of the
property owners and the character of the governmental action. Radin's insights and interests are much
broader than her treatment of certain highly personal property, but it is precisely her discussion of property implicating its owner's personhood that is important for the present discussion, which is limited to
this aspect of her work.
204 For lack of a better and less ambiguous phrase, this Article will refer to such property as "deeply
personal property."
205 Cf RADN, supra note 20, at 154 ("[Market value] is the dominant legal
standard for determining
compensation, but it can seem quite wrong in cases where property interests are apprehended as personal
and incommensurate with money.").
206 RADIN, supra note 20, at 1005.
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More fundamentally, assigning value to these deep personal connections may work an independent harm. 2 7 According to Radin, the act of
monetizing the human body, for example, functions to devalue it.2"' Fair
market value therefore seems doubly inadequate both because it provides
less than full indemnification and because it uses the vocabulary of the
market to arrive at compensation. 29 This same criticism has been leveled
against tort damages for personal injury, 210 but there, at least, jurors are usually instructed about the difficulty of assigning monetary values to such
harms. 1
In takings there is no recognition of any problem of incommensurability: compensation for takings is measured by the market value
of the property taken. The fungibility of property is deeply ingrained in the
compensation standard.212
Injunctions are not the only answer, however. Alternatives to a hardand-fast property rule would also address some of Radin's concerns. For
example, restitutionary as opposed to damage-based awards would shift the
focus of the compensation inquiry from commodifying what the property
owner has lost to valuing what the government has gained instead. Alternatively, compensation that is sufficiently punitive could function systemically to encourage the government to bargain for the property owner's
consent.1 3 While this might result in much higher costs to the government,
207 As Radin again notes, "In such cases it may be difficult to decide whether compensatory justice
requires higher compensation or whether no compensation should be paid because the problem is outside the scope of compensatory justice." RADIN, supra note 20, at 154.
208 Id. at 201.
209 As Radin explains, "These cases are suspect because their implicit assumption that forced transfers at the market price justly compensates owners treats personal property as fungible." Id. at 141.
210See Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DuKE L.J. 56, 62-68
(1993).
211 See Pattern Civ. Jury Instr., 5th Cir. § 15.4 (1995) ("You may award damages for any bodily injury that the plaintiff sustained and any pain and suffering, [disability], [disfigurement], [mental anguish], [and/or] [loss of capacity for enjoyment of life] that the plaintiff experienced in the past [or will
experience in the future] as a result of the bodily injury.... You are not trying to determine value, but
an amount that will fairly compensate the plaintiff for the damages he has suffered. There is no exact
standard for fixing the compensation to be awarded for these elements of damage.") (brackets in original); see also New York Pattern Jury Instr. 2:277 (Comment) ("Aside from their general experience,
there is no legal criterion to guide the jurors in translating into money values such intangibles as pain,
suffering and shock"); Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. 30.06 (Comment) ("Noneconomic damages are not susceptible of precise measurement, and evidence that assigns an actual dollar value to the injury or that
fixes the amount of damages with mathematical certainty is not required.").
212 There is a sense, of course, in which Radin's theory proves too much in the takings context. After all, people regularly sell homes in which they have longstanding, personal and sentimental attachments. We, as a society, do not object to these transactions the way we object to prostitution and the
sale of one's body. Radin's objection is therefore not to the sale itself but rather to the forced sale.
While Radin may want to problematize what counts as a voluntary transaction, she cannot seriously dispute that there is a price at which an individual would be willing to sell the family homestead.
213 There is precedent for punitive damages in a similar context. See Epstein, supra note 143, at
2114-15 ("[T]he compensation rule under the Mill Acts called for the payment of some premium, here
of fifty percent, over the market value.... [I]t probably had the greater advantage of offering a modi-
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finite but super-compensatory awards would leave the government with a
backstop to prevent truly extortionate demands arising out of rent-seeking
holdouts, while exerting a strong pressure on the government to negotiate
with the property owner.
Radin's underlying concerns would also be addressed through compensation based on the owner's subjective harm. Compensating for subjective harm would vindicate, and indeed respect, the personal nature of the
property taken, and recharacterizing the property sometimes allows courts
to award at least part of the property owner's subjective value.214 Since recharacterizing the property is not always possible, and subjective harm is
difficult to measure directly, valuation geared toward preventing the governmental action in the first place will permit the property owner to hold out
for her reservation price.2" 5 As with general hostility toward the government, compensating the burdened owner becomes secondary to creating a
systemic pressure that acts as an ex ante disincentive for the government to
regulate "personal" property at all.2" 6 In those situations, the supercompensatory awards described in the context of hostility to the government also provide appropriate remedies for takings of deeply personal prop7
erty.

21

Replacement value may also provide adequate protection, depending
on the property and the nature of the damages suffered. While a new, comparable house may not adequately compensate for sentimental attachments,
replacement value for a church, clubhouse, or even funeral parlor, may

cum of protection for those elements of value that are sometimes hard to quantify in an objective setting.
For farmland, the rule seemed to go beyond that objective by giving the landowner some portion of the
gain that came from the venture in which his land was conscripted .... The premium was a proxy for
that large net advantage.").
214 See supra Part I.B.7.
215 Recent arms-length, third party offers for the property that the owner rejected may at least provide a baseline for subjective value, i.e., the property must have been worth more to the owner than the
offer price or the owner would have sold. Alternatively, a recent article proposes a system in which
property owners are invited to self-report the extent of their damages for so-called derivative takingsimpacts on property that are the result of regulations of others' property. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supro note 201, at 281-83. Under this proposal, the government would have the ability to sue for false
reporting and this, the authors claim, would have a sufficient deterrent effect to ensure that self-reported
damages were not overstated. Such a system might also be available for awarding subjective damages,
except that false-reporting would be much harder to test in subsequent suits because of the abstract nature of subjective value.
216 In fact, this may be the more appropriate measure of recovery, at least where the act of valuing
the taking commodifies the burdened property in a way that may inherently undermine its personal
value. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1485
(1989). Although this is similar to the valuation employed by the general anti-regulation perspective, it
reflects a very different normative goal embodying a very different level of protection. Cf Hermalin,
supra note 44, at 72 ("What must be remembered, however, is that what matters is not the total amount
of the citizen's compensation, but rather how her compensation varies on the relevant margin.").
217 See supra Part 11.B.1.
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compensate the property owner for her actual use of the property, even if its
market value would have been lower.2t5
But why look to compensation at all instead of relying on the injunctive relief Radin endorses? Using valuation mechanisms to approximate
forms of property rule protection may seem like an unnecessary second-best
option. Injunctive relief is not always possible, however, and courts cannot
29
always return the parties to a pre-existing state of affairs. Doctrinal constraints in existing law also prevent courts from creating broad property rule
protection.22 °
At the end of the day, too, Radin's proposal is an admitted departure
from current takings doctrine. Compensation, on the other hand, provides
courts with a means of vindicating Radin's core interests without revising
existing law. Perhaps even more importantly, courts may be more willing
to award higher damages than to enjoin a government action. Awareness of
appropriate valuation mechanisms may actually expand courts' willingness
to protect core personhood interests, even if the scope of the protection is
something less than Radin herself advocates. In other words, a carefully
crafted approach to compensation can fill in when injunctive relief is either
impossible or unpalatable.
E. The New Economic Model: Compensation and PoliticalPower
In assigning particular valuation mechanisms to existing takings theories, the preceding discussion has relied at least implicitly on the assumption that forcing the government to pay compensation will have some
deterrent effect on its willingness to act. 22' Recent public choice theory
scholarship has challenged this longstanding assumption by suggesting that
compensation can function perversely to insulate government actors from
paying the political costs for their actions.222
Traditionally, the paradigmatic conception of the Takings Clause is as
a form of countermajoritarian backstop: forcing the government to pay
when it takes property will prevent a majority from imposing an undue bur218 Replacement value is expressly approved as an award for so-called special use property. See,
e.g., Grammercy Boys' Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 529 N.Y.S.2d 476 (App. Div. 1988) (awarding
replacement value for clubhouse); City of Rochester v. Ryan & Mclntee, Inc. 393 N.Y.S.2d 137 (App.
Div. 1977) (funeral parlor); Congregation of Sons of Israel v. State, 387 N.Y.S.2d 738 (App. Div. 1976)
(synagogue).
219 See text accompanying notes 144-145.
220 In fact, limitations on the public use requirement are almost nonexistent giving the government's
nearly limitless authority to condemn property so long as it pays compensation. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014 (1984). But see Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004)
(granting certiorari on public use case).
221 As Fischel has pointed out, "governments required to pay for regulations can quickly change
their minds about the need for regulation." FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 151.
222 For a general description of public choice theory, see Croley, supra note 141, at 34-41. For a
discussion of public choice theory's implications for takings, see generally Farber, supra note 173.
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den on a small minority.223 As the Supreme Court has frequently observed,
the Takings Clause is designed to prevent the majority from imposing on a
minority costs that, in fairness, should be borne by everyone.224 This is entirely consistent with the traditional cost-internalization rationale for compensation.
The effect of compensation is quite different, however, when a highly
mobilized special interest group uses its political power to force through
some inefficient government action. Here, the problem is not a majority
group unfairly burdening a small minority but just the opposite: a small
special interest group burdening the majority. This is far more consistent
with public choice theorists' description of the legislative process.
At its most basic level, public choice posits that legislators are not perfect agents for the collective will of their constituents but have their own
self-interested motivations that contribute to their decisions. 25 What follows is that governments do not internalize costs the way private actors
do.226 Public choice theorists argue, as a descriptive matter, that small, mobilized special interest groups have a relative advantage in the political
process."' This is especially likely where the voting constituency is large
and information and organizational costs are high. 28
When a taking occurs as a result of special interest group rent-seeking,
compensation threatens to serve a particularly pernicious purpose. In fact,
providing high compensation for takings may actually silence the one person (or group) that would otherwise have been sufficiently mobilized to oppose an inefficient governmental regulation:
the burdened property
223

See Treanor, supra note 19, at 825 ("Because of faith in majoritarian decisionmakers, the early

state constitutions did not contain substantive protections of property rights. They simply contained
procedural protections-land could be taken only with the consent of the individual or of the legislature.").
224 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) ("The Fifth Amendment's
guarantee that
private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole."); see also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S.
621, 656 (1981) (citing other cases).
225 Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Public Choice Revisited, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1715,
1717
(1998) (book review) ("What holds this diverse movement [of public choice] together is a common
methodology based on the concept of rational decisionmaking: simply put, political actors, like economic ones, make rational decisions designed to maximize the achievement of their preferences.").
226 Levinson, supranote 130, at 347-52.
227 See, e.g., Croley, supra note 141, at 35 (citing George
J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. So. 3 (1971)); see also MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION 53 (1965) (arguing that smaller groups enjoy a relative political advantage over larger groups).
228 NEIL KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS 61 (2001) ("Interest groups with small numbers but high per
capita stakes have sizeable advantages in political action over interest groups with larger numbers and
smaller per capita stakes, because higher per capita stakes mean that the members of the interest group
will have greater incentive to expend the effort necessary to recognize and understand the issues. In the
extreme but not uncommon case, the members of the low per capita stakes losing majority (often consumers or taxpayers) do not even have the incentive to recognize that they are being harmed.").
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owners.22 9 Perversely, the higher the compensation paid, the lower the
likely resistance to the governmental action. Since the costs of the action
are spread across all taxpayers, any increase in compensation to the burdened property owner will minimize her opposition, while only marginally
increasing the cost of the action to the special interest group behind the
governmental action.
Because of this insight, Daniel Farber has suggested that any mandatory compensation requirement will be detrimental to efficient legislative
incentives.23 ° By preventing compensation or perhaps by awarding only
partial compensation, adversely affected property owners will have more
reason to fight to stop the taking."' At the least, this will pit two discrete
and motivated interest groups against each other. Public choice theorists
argue that the political process is more likely to function properly in this
situation than when a mobilized interest group can impose costs on a diffuse, generally disinterested general public.232
The appropriate answer to this problem, however, is not necessarily to
award zero compensation. First, and most importantly, most empirical
work does not support public choice theorists' descriptive claims about the
political process.233

More substantively, too, Farber's critique is deeply

context-dependent. Indeed, both Farber and Levinson acknowledge that the
effect of compensation is dependent on the political power of the affected
groups.234 Where takings are not motivated by special interest group capture, but more genuinely reflect the desire of a politically mobilized majority, compensation will at least function in the right direction for creating
efficient government incentives.235
More generally, Farber's concern that compensation will silence politito a government action may underestimate how much comopposition
cal
229

Id. at 94-95; Farber, supra note 173, at 290 ("The effect of the compensation requirement is to

buy off the landowners and shift the cost of the project to other groups.").
230 Farber, supra note 173, at 293 ("Assuming that the dispossessed will usually be a stronger political force than the alternative cost-bearers, a compensation requirement will lead to more rent-seeking
(pork barrel) projects than an anti-compensation rule.").
231 For a fictional but humorous example, watch THE CASTLE (Miramax 1999).
232 See Farber, supra note 173, at 293. As Farber goes on to explain, requiring compensation "will
buy off the group otherwise most likely to bring costs forcefully to the attention of the legislators." Id.
233 Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REv. 873,
895 (1987) ("Most of the empirical evidence supporting the economic theory of legislation is, in fact,
quite unconvincing."); Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 63, 88 (1990) (citing empirical studies).
234 Farber, supra note 173, at 293 (distinguishing the effects of compensation in a variety of situations); Levinson, supra note 130, at 415 ("Depending on the model of the political process employed as
an exchange mechanism between financial and political costs, and on numerous contextual variables, the
deterrence effects of compensation on government behavior seem as likely to be perverse as beneficial.").
235 Komesar, supra note 228, at 93-99 (discussing the effect of compensation given majoritarian
and minoritarian bias); Farber, supra note 173, at 288.
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pensation is required to overcome opposition to government interference
with people's private property. Consistent with the intuition expressed in
the redistributive approach, private property owners' assent to a government
action may not come cheaply.236 Many current forms of compensation will
fail to silence the group best situated to object to a government action, leaving the political interests properly aligned.
Of course, here too the story is context-dependent. Even if compensation is not linearly related to political opposition, it may still blunt more political opposition by property owners than it creates in the general taxpaying
public, which will have to pay the compensation. To put it simply, any
government that takes property will necessarily bear some political cost for
having to outlay money, because that money must be raised either through
increased taxes or cutting back on other services. Spread over a large
enough or disinterested enough constituency, the political cost might be
minimal, but even Farber does not deny it exists. On the other hand, paying
compensation decreases the political cost imposed by the burdened property
owner and her sympathizers. Ultimately, then, whether or not compensation minimizes the political costs of any particular governmental action depends on how responsive the property owner and the taxpayers are to
compensation.
This critique goes to the heart of the takings debate. Much of the preceding compensation analysis relies at least implicitly on the assumption
that requiring the government to pay more money will generally result in
less government action. If that basic assumption does not hold-or, does
not necessarily hold-then the specific prescriptions in each of the preceding sections need to be modified. Substantial additional work, far outside
the scope of this Article, will need to be undertaken before conclusions can
be drawn about when, and under what conditions, this correlation is
unlikely to be true. For example, it may well be the case that the deterrent
effect of compensation tracks the level of government doing the taking, or
the specific nature of the government action. But this is a question best
saved for another day. For now, this Article follows the decades of scholarship in assuming that increased compensation will decrease the government's appetite for regulating private property.
Leaving aside this recent critique of the traditional economic account,
the table below summarizes the appropriate valuation mechanism for each
of the takings approaches discussed in Part II.237

236 See supra text accompanying note 198.
237 Like the list of valuation mechanisms, the list of substantive approaches to takings considered
in
this Article is not exhaustive. Other theories could be accommodated in subsequent work by identifying
the valuation mechanisms that are best paired with their explicit or implicit goals.
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TAKINGS THEORY

Hostility to the Government

Deference to the Government

Insurance and Distributive Justice
Personality Theory

The Meaning of Value
APPROPRIATE VALUATION MECHANISMS

(1) Recharacterizing the property; (2) Highest
and best use-allocating risk to the government; (3) Higher of gain or loss; (4) Compensating for condemnation blight
(1) Reducing compensation by permissible but
unenacted regulations; (2) Highest and best
use-allocating risk to the property owner; (3)
Lower of gain or loss; (4) Compensating for no
condemnation blight
(1) Benefit Offset
(1) Recharacterizing the property (or other
valuation mechanisms reflecting hostility to the
government); (2) Replacement value

TABLE: TAKINGS THEORIES AND APPROPRIATE VALUATION
MECHANISMS

This Part has identified the valuation mechanisms that are best suited
to advance the goals of the various takings theories. While technical rules
limit, for example, when courts can apply replacement value instead of fair
market value,238 this overarching framework at least identifies the interests
promoted by the different compensation rules. Instead of a random assortment of fact-specific rules, applied in an ad hoc and indefensible manner,
the consistent application of valuation mechanisms can actually advance the
core interests that underlie various takings regimes.
III. CASES OF VALUE
The preceding sections have developed a theoretical translation scheme
between the nine different valuation mechanisms and the leading approaches to the Takings Clause. 239 This Part moves from theory to practice,
identifying and analyzing in depth cases that can be interpreted consistently
with this translation scheme. The collection of cases presented below is by
no means intended to reflect a representative sample of takings cases, nor to
suggest that even these particular courts have developed the kind of nuanced, context-dependent approach to compensation articulated in Part II.
But interpreting actual cases in a manner consistent with this Article's prescriptions demonstrates how existing doctrine can accommodate an ap-

See supra Part 1.B.9.
Net harm was omitted from this discussion because it is so new; we have yet to see how courts
will apply it in practice and what effect it might have on compensation. Presumably, if used at all, it
will be used to limit compensation, but how, and to what extent, remains to be seen.
238

239
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proach to compensation that is in step with the Takings Clause's different
normative justifications.
In order to propose a fit in existing case law between valuation mechanisms and underlying takings theories, it is first necessary to attribute specific takings theories to real world cases.24 ° This is no simple task. Despite
the rich scholarly takings literature, courts seldom follow one particular
academic approach, but rather wrestle individually with each case presented. Accordingly, the interpretations that follow face two distinct challenges: they must both identify the specific valuation mechanisms used by
the court and suggest what underlying takings theory was appropriate on the
facts of the case.
To advocates of the various takings theories, it may seem like a strange
project indeed to identify factual conditions that act as triggers for the various takings theories. Taken on their own terms, they are not factually contingent. This is true enough, but the analysis here is more normative than
descriptive. Rather than suggesting that a court was actually motivated by a
specific constitutional theory, this Part gathers cases that implicate substantive interests reflecting the core concerns of a particular takings theory. Ultimately, this Part can do no more than use hindsight to propose
interpretations of various cases that are consistent with this Article's new
theoretical framework. But the payoff is still substantial. By identifying
factual conditions under which a substantive takings theory seems particularly appropriate, it is possible to demonstrate how courts' actual valuation
decisions can be interpreted to reflect that specific theory.
The normative claim here is more limited than it may seem. This Part
does not argue that courts should adopt different substantive approaches to
the Takings Clause depending on the facts of a given case, but only that certain factual situations implicate the same sets of concerns that animate one
or another of the takings theories. Identifying where these concerns overlap
is the preliminary project of each section in Part III. Because courts may
not be-or at least may not admit to being-motivated by one particular
takings theory, the best way to provide examples of this Article's normative
prescriptions in practice is to focus on cases that raise concerns consistent
with a particular takings theory.
More often than not, courts' valuation decisions are inconsistent with
"
their specified goals.24
' Accordingly, this Part does not pretend to bring order to the entire body of takings cases. But by focusing on those cases
where courts' valuation decisions were consistent with the takings theory
240 The analysis in this Part could have proceeded in the reverse
order. Instead of first extracting
courts' underlying motivation and then examining whether they adopted appropriate valuation mechanisms, it would also be possible to identify the valuation mechanisms in various cases first and then
identify whether they are used in a manner consistent with the courts' underlying goals. Either analysis
would reveal real-world applications of this Article's normative prescriptions.
241 A few of those cases are identified and discussed supra
text accompanying notes 30-38.
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imputed to them, this Part not only demonstrates the opportunity to implement the Article's approach to compensation, but also shows how such prescriptions could play out in practice. Recognizing instances of even
inadvertent consistency in the existing case law is the first step toward encouraging more consistency in the future.
A. Cases of Hostility to the Government
This Article has described hostility to governmental action largely in
terms of public choice theory, suggesting the deep political disagreements
at the heart of the Takings Clause. And indeed, many courts' approaches to
compensation can perhaps be explained by individual judges' background
political beliefs, although the impact of such political views can be more or
less apparent in any given case.242 There are, however, fact-specific reasons
why a court would be hostile to a governmental action in a particular case.
For example, courts are naturally more hostile where the government has
acted in bad faith,243 perhaps regulating in lieu of exercising its power of
eminent domain in an effort to avoid paying any compensation at all, or
where the action is so grossly inefficient that it appears to be the product of
political capture by a special interest group. 2" In these cases, courts are often especially ready to find a taking and, through damage awards, make
such regulations particularly expensive for the government.
245
In Del Monte Dunes at Monterey v. City of Monterey, numerous broken promises by the City of Monterey gave rise to a strong appearance of
bad faith.246 Plaintiffs sought to create a residential development of 344
242 One case in which the judges' political points of view appear descriptively powerful is Love-

ladies Harbor,Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994). There, the Court of Appeals upheld
a claims court judgment allocating all development risks to the government and permitting plaintiff to
recover the full pre-regulation value of the property despite the fact that it retained some residual value
after the taking. The three judge panel in Loveladies included at least two very conservative judges:
Judge Rader, appointed to the federal judiciary in 1990 by President Bush, served exclusively as chief
counsel to Senator Orrin Hatch from 1981-1986; Judge Plager, who wrote the opinion, was also a Bush
appointee. See 2 ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2004). He has written other noteworthy opinions upholding private property rights against governmental regulations. See, e.g., Preseault v. United
States, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that Rails-to-Trails Act converting railroad easement
into bicycle paths constituted a taking); Brown v. United States, 73 F.3d 1100 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding
that low level military overflights constituted a taking even if the owner's actual use of the property was
not impaired).
243 Distrust may also come from disagreement with the legislative goals being pursued. For example, some judges may be antagonistic to environmental regulations, others to pro-business regulations.
These kinds of goal-based concerns are their own form of pre-legal political judgments and are not discussed further.
244 Joseph Sax has recommended that governmental purpose is relevant to the taking question, arguing that compensation is due when the government operates like a private party or an enterprise organization. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
245 95 F.3d 1422 (9th Cir. 1996).
246 Other examples of courts awarding higher compensation in the face of governmental bad faith
include United States v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202, 203 n.2 (1979) (per curiam) (distinguishing prior
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units on their property. The City of Monterey's city planners denied the
site plan, but "stated that a proposal for ...264 units, would be received favorably. 2 47 The plaintiffs then submitted a site plan for 264 units, but were
denied again. "At that time, the city planners stated that a proposal for 224
residential units would be favorably received. A revised proposal for 224
units was submitted.""24 The commission denied this too and the process
continued through two more iterations.
Upholding a finding that a taking had occurred, the Ninth Circuit focused on the tortured history of the plaintiffs permit applications. The numerous broken promises give rise to a strong appearance of bad faith on the
part of the City of Monterey. The court ultimately adopted a valuation
mechanism consistent with this hostility, allocating all the risk of the plaintiff's development to the government by upholding a jury award including
interest at a higher than average rate of return. 249 Not only did this award
remove the risk to the plaintiffs that their project would not have been completed as planned, but it also removed the risk to the plaintiffs that their pro-

ject would not have been an above average success.25 °
Courts have also shifted substantial litigation costs to the government
in the face of bad faith. In United States v. Lee,25' the Fifth Circuit awarded
the costs of conducting a land survey to the plaintiff as part of the compensation award. In United States v. Bodcaw,252 the Supreme Court rejected a
broad reading of Lee but refused to overturn the case because Lee "involved
misrepresentation on the part of the Government ...
.""I In other words,
case awarding fees to property owner because the earlier case "involved misrepresentations on the part
of the Government as to the amount of land to be taken"); City of Pheonix v. Magnum, 912 P.2d. 35, 38
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (awarding compensation in excess of fair market value due to government's bad
faith).
247 Del Monte Dunes at Monterey v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d
1496, 1502 (9th Cir. 1990).
248 1d. at 1502.
249Dreier, 95 F.3d at 1435. Although jury awards themselves are beyond
the scope of this Article,
there is a strong intuition that jurors might award higher damages when the government has intentionally
abused its power.
250See also Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 664 F.2d 99 (5th Cir.
1981). In Wheeler, the city of
Pleasant Grove withdrew a building permit to the vendor and developer of an apartment complex after a
public outcry against the development. The court ordered the permit to issue and awarded damages for
the temporary taking by comparing the value of the property as regulated with the value of the property
as ifit had been developed. It ultimately reduced this figure by the equity interest the landowners would
have had in the property and then multiplied the equity stake by a fair rate of return over the duration of
the taking. Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 896 F.2d 1347, 1351-52 (11 th Cir. 1990); cf Osprey
Pac. Corp. v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 150 (1998) (valuing a leasehold by the full value of the underlying property after the United States improperly seized a boat from the plaintiff and donated it to the
Boys & Girls Club of South San Francisco).
251 360 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1966).
252 440 U.S. 202 (1979).
253 Id. at 203 n.2; see also Hinesburg Sand & Gravel Co. v. Chittenden
Solid Waste Dist., 959 F.
Supp. 652, 658-59 (D. Vt. 1997) (discussing "misrepresentation exception" to general rule that litigation
costs are not imposed on the government in a condemnation case).
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the government's misrepresentations justified awarding extra litigation expenses to the burdened property owner.
Interestingly, Congress has embodied this idea in a statutory entitlement for property owners to recover attorneys' fees in certain condemnation
actions. In particular, where a property owner successfully defeats a condemnation action, or where the government voluntarily withdraws a condemnation claim, property owners are statutorily entitled to recover their
legal fees. 254 The primary basis on which a property owner can defeat a
condemnation action is to prove that the government was not taking the
property for public use.255 Property owners rarely succeed on these claims,
but the situations in which they do correlate strongly with the government
acting on behalf of special interest groups. 6 In fact, these situations are
almost paradigmatically what public choice theorists have in mind when
they discuss special interest groups' rent-seeking behavior. Removing all
discretion in shifting litigation expenses to the government is an appropriately super-compensatory award in these circumstances.25 7
B. Cases of Deference to the Government
Deference to the government's regulatory power is on the opposite end
of the same spectrum. In the context of a particular regulation, courts may
be particularly deferential where government has acted in good faith, or
where there is a specific reason to trust the government, despite its regulatory overreaching. This increased deference may arise from the purpose of
the government's action258 or the facts of a specific case.
Examples of courts adopting appropriate valuation mechanisms in the
presence of governmental good faith are easy to find. In Herrington v.
County of Sonoma,259 plaintiffs John and David Herrington sued after the
County of Sonoma found their proposal to build a thirty-two-lot subdivision
on their property inconsistent with the general plan.26 The Court agreed
that the Herringtons' proposal was impermissible under the general plan
because "the proposed density [was] inconsistent with the preservation of

254 See 42 U.S.C. § 4654 (2000).
255 See Joseph J. Lazzarotti, Public Use or Public Abuse, 68 UMKC L. REv. 49, 59-68 (1999) (describing history of public use limitation on eminent domain). One example of such a challenge can be
found in BickerstaffClay ProductsCo. v. Harris County, 89 F.3d 1481, 1490 (1996).
256 The public use requirement is essentially coextensive with the scope of the government's powers. See supra note 220. Consequently, states must be operating outside their extremely broad police
powers to violate the public use requirement.
257 See supra Part 1.B.6.
258 For example, courts have often been willing to defer more broadly to the government in the context of military decisions. See, e.g., Margaret A. Garvin, Civil Liberties During War, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 691, 705-10 (1999); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
259 790 F. Supp 909 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
260 Id. at 911.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
agricultural and timber resources on the Herringtons' parcel." 26' The Ninth
Circuit nevertheless held that the County had violated procedural due process by making certain key land use decisions without the Herringtons' par-

ticipation. In other words, the County's substantive motives were not
suspect, but only the procedures that the County implemented to effectuate

its general plan.
The Herrington court adopted an award consistent with the County's
good faith. Due to procedural intricacies not relevant here,262 the Ninth Cir-

cuit first refused to find a permanent taking but remanded to the district
court to value a temporary taking for the temporary denial of the plaintiffs'

building permit. 63 The Ninth Circuit further instructed that the Herringtons

were not entitled to value their property based on the full thirty-two-unit

development plan because "the approval of a 32-lot subdivision by the

County was speculative.

264

Instead, the district court held that it had to

"determine what valid restrictions could be placed on plaintiffs' land" in

order to set the upper boundary of the award. 65 In other words, the district
court declined to base its award on the highest and best use sought by the
plaintiffs, but instead reduced it by the value of the permissible but unenacted regulations that could have been imposed on the Herringtons' property.

266

261Herrington v. Sonoma County, 834 F.2d 1488, 1492 (9th
Cir. 1987).
262The Ninth Circuit struck down the County's permit denial
and required new procedural protections for landowners. The court did not, however, instruct the County to issue the plaintiffs building
permit. Instead, the Ninth Circuit held that a temporary taking had occurred between the time of the
original denial of the building permit and the time it was struck down.
263 See Herrington, 790 F. Supp. at 911 (describing the procedural history).
In essence, the Ninth
Circuit held that plaintiffs had abandoned their permanent taking claim and narrowly confined the district court's discretion on remand.
264Id. at 912 (citing Herrington,834 F.2d at
1504).
265See id. at 914. In fact, the district court determined that it
should "award market rate computed
over the period of the temporary taking on the difference between the property's fair market value without the regulatory restriction and its fair market value with the restriction." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). This required the court to determine a permissible level of regulation in order to determine the
"after" value of the property. See id.
266 See also Foster v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 426 (1983). In Foster, the
court awarded the lease
value of mining rights instead of the fair market value of the dolomite deposits that were taken. This
compensation award is entirely consistent with a presumption of governmental good faith, an appropriate presumption here because the property was taken to activate Camp Cooke, an Army camp to train
armored and infantry divisions. The flip side of awarding low compensation when the government has
acted in good faith, is awarding low compensation when the property owner has acted in bad faith. This
would explain the court's holding in Yuba Natural Resources, Inc. v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577 (Fed.
Cir. 1990). In Yuba, the court refused to award lost profits or any of the property's owner real but subjective damages. Yuba owned a gold mine that had been inactive for almost a decade. When Yuba decided to explore the possibility of mining the property again, the Army Corps of Engineers informed
Yuba, incorrectly, that the United States had a valid interest in portions of Yuba's land. Yuba nevertheless commenced negotiations with a mining company, Yuba, 904 F.2d at 1579 ("At that time Yuba
lacked both the money and the expertise to conduct mining operations alone."), ignoring the govern-
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Similarly broad deference to the government is also represented by
Branning v. United States,267 involving the value of an avignation easement
for military aircraft.268 Specifically, the court in Branning had to decide the
value of the easement over property that was never fully developed because
of military overflights. 269 Evidence showed that the landowners had originally contemplated a medium-density residential-recreational project, that
the highest and best use of the property was a high-density development,
and that the highest and best use of the property with the avignation easement was a low-density development. Courts have traditionally demonstrated broad deference to the government in military matters, and the
valuation mechanism adopted by the Branningcourt is no exception.
In order to value the taking, the court compared the value of the property prior to the easement with the value of the property after the easement. 27' First, however, the court found that plaintiffs experts' assessment
of the property's value without the easement failed to take into account the
272
military overflights that had occurred prior to the taking. This implicitly
acknowledged that a certain number of military overflights would not have
effectuated a taking and that the value of the property before the taking had
to be reduced by the cost imposed by the permissible level of those flights.
Second, the court rejected a value of the property that included $1 million in anticipated profits from the high density development, holding that
an award of profits would have shifted the risks of the development to the
government.273 While it is indeed true that compensating fully for anticipated profits shifts the risks of the project to the government, denying all
ment's claimed valid interests. Yuba ultimately prevailed, but the court awarded relatively low compensation.
267 6 Cl. Ct. 618 (1984).
268 But see Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 201, at 280-81 (arguing that so-called derivative takings, which include paradigmatically overflights, are conceptually distinct from regulatory takings).
269 The evidence specifically showed that a nearby airbase was used for pilots to practice take-offs
and landings in conditions that simulated an aircraft carrier. This involved "F-4 aircraft follow[ing] one
another almost nose-to-tail in an unvarying loop.., at an altitude of 600 feet above ground level, with
noses up and tails down, and with the near-maximum power and noise associated with low speed."
Branning, 6 Cl. Ct. at 620.
270 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Herrington v. Sonoma County, 834 F.2d
1488, 1492 (9th Cir. 1987).
271 The actual value assigned to each of these uses was deeply contested, and several expert witnesses provided conflicting testimony. See generally Branning,6 Cl. Ct. at 618.
272 The existing overflights were not permissible but unenacted regulations because they had already been imposed on the property owner. Nevertheless, the reasoning is closely analogous; the court
reduced the total compensation by that amount of regulation-or here, governmental interference-that
would not have been a taking.
273 The court explained, "In view of the financial risks that would have been involved in the future
development of the plaintiff's property, even absent any avignation easement, it hardly seems reasonable
to assume that the hypothetical 'willing buyer' would have agreed to pay in cash to the 'willing seller' a
price that would include all the profit which the 'willing buyer' expected to derive from the future development of the property, if all went well." Branning,6 Cl. Ct. at 626.
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profits presumes that a willing buyer would discount anticipated profits by
100%. This extremely conservative assumption shifts all of the risks of the
development to the Brannings 74 This valuation mechanism is an appropriate award to express courts' general deference to the government in military
matters, for better or worse.
Perhaps most importantly, in its recent decision Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington,275 the Supreme Court reviewed Washington State's
Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts ("IOLTA") program, requiring attorneys
to deposit client funds in interest-bearing accounts with the interest payable
to charitable organizations providing legal services to people with low income. 76 Nationwide, states' IOLTA programs provide over $200 million
annually in legal services for the poor. The Supreme Court held that Washington's IOLTA program was a taking of clients' funds, but that just compensation was zero.277 Specifically, the Court held that takings are to be
valued by the property owners' net harm which, in Brown, meant the net
value of the interest that clients could have made if their funds had been deposited in non-IOLTA accounts.
I have previously argued that the Court's net harm rule should be interpreted as a species of fair market value, but also acknowledged the linedrawing problem of deciding which fees and administrative expenses to include in the market value calculation.278 If governmental good faith influences where those lines are to be drawn, then Brown is perhaps more
justifiable as an example of judicial deference to an important government
program.
In dissent, Justice Scalia accused the majority of creating a new rule of
deference for "Robin Hood Takings," i.e., takings of which the Court approved. 79 But is this really so surprising? Why is the governmental purpose irrelevant to takings doctrine? Justice Scalia seems to assume that it
will result in unprincipled decisionmaking, allowing the Court to uphold
laws it likes and strike down those it does not. But his dissent assumes,
without reasoning, that takings are to be viewed entirely from the perspective of their impact on the property owner. In fact, the government's motivation and conduct can influence how courts will evaluate a regulation's
impact on private property. Is it so surprising, then, that the Court would
adopt a more deferential approach in the face of governmental good faith?
274 Cf United States v. 62.50 Acres of Land, 953 F.2d 886
(5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting plaintiffs
claim that the property could be best used for clam shell mining or for a camp site,
valued at $899,075
and $266,000, respectively, and holding that the land was best used as an undeveloped
recreational facility, valued at $54,000).
275 538 U.S. 216 (2003).
276 Id. at 220. Brown involved a challenge
to Washington State's IOLTA program,
but the Court's

ruling could have applied to every state's IOLTA program.
277 Id. at 240.

278 See Serkin, supra note 4,
at 430.
279 Brown, 538 U.S. at 252 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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Instead of an unprincipled new valuation rule, the Court's net harm calculation in Brown appears to be an appropriate application of the fair market
value standard.
C. Cases of Insurance and DistributiveJustice
The appropriate measure of compensation for both the insurance and
distributive justice approaches to takings is an application of the benefitoffset test, where the range of benefits a court will consider varies proportionately with the property owner's wealth. Courts adopting either of these
approaches should be more willing to offset a broader range of benefits
when a property owner is wealthy and less willing when the property owner
is not. The results can be anywhere from no set-off to a full set-off, i.e.,
zero compensation or a finding that no taking occurred because the property
owner received an average reciprocity of advantage from the government.
There are representative cases all along this spectrum.
0
In Hendler v. United States, 28 plaintiff sued for a permanent physical
occupation when the government installed pollution monitoring wells on his
land. The court viewed the wells as part of a program of pollution remediation and held that they provided a "special benefit" to the plaintiff, the value
of which should be offset against the harm imposed by the presence of the
monitoring wells. The opinion notes, however, that California was to bear
28
"
the costs of fixing the groundwater pollution. ' By offsetting this benefit,
the court was, in effect, including something generally like the benefit of
membership in the community to minimize the compensation due for the
taking claim.
Laughlin v. United States282 is an example of the benefit-offset test used
to preclude any compensation by expanding the range of benefits even further. Plaintiff in that case owned 320 acres of farmland in the Mohave Valley near the Colorado River. 283 Five consecutive years of heavy rains, from
1983 to 1987, led to flooding of the plaintiffs property as a result of dams
on the Colorado River, including the Hoover Dam. Plaintiff argued that the
federal government's system of dams effectively deprived him of any economic use of his land for those five years. The Court of Claims disagreed,
in part because the plaintiff received a benefit from the dams that outweighed the harm he suffered during the five years his property was unusable. 284 The court focused on the historical fact that little property in the
Mohave Valley was used for farmland before the construction of the Hoo280 38 Cl. Ct. 611 (1997).
281 See id. at 617 (construing defendant's argument as accepting responsibility to abate the groundwater pollution).
282 22 Cl. Ct. 85 (1990).
283 Id. at 94-95.
284 Id. at 112 ("In analyzing relative benefits, a court must balance the overall benefits and detriments of the Government's conduct in relationship to their impact on a claimant's property.").
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ver Dam. Therefore, according to the court, "[w]ithout the flood control
system, plaintiffs land in its natural state largely would have been unusable
for farming purposes. Thus, Hoover Dam and its successor improvements
directly benefited plaintiffs land by providing a stable source of irrigation
water and by greatly reducing the likelihood of surface flooding .
,,2." In
other words, the general benefits to the plaintiffs property conferred by the
dams more than offset the harms they imposed.
What is striking about Laughlin, however, is how the court construed
the nature of the challenged governmental action. While the plaintiffs theory of causation included the government's development of the dams, he
pointed more specifically to the placement of an extensive marsh just south
of his property that the government maintained with artificially high water
levels because it had become "an important wildlife refuge."286
'
The court
did not identify any specific benefit from the marsh to the plaintiff's property. Ultimately, then, the court took a broad view of the benefits accruing
to the plaintiff as a result of the government's general regulation of the
Colorado River. This is a broader range of benefits than the court needed to
consider and includes the kind of long-term benefits appropriate for larger,
less risk-averse property owners. It is also indistinguishable in its result
from the reciprocity of advantage test.
Perhaps the most extreme example of a court considering a broad range
of benefits when evaluating the takings claim of a wealthy property owner
is Shanghai Power Co. v. United States.287 Shanghai Power Company
owned and operated a power plant confiscated by the People's Republic of
China ("PRC") in 1950. Shanghai Power sued pursuant to the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission, seeking $54 million. In 1979, however,
President Carter settled the plaintiffs claims against the PRC, without
plaintiffs consent, in the process of establishing diplomatic relations with
that country.288 Shanghai Power sued the United States, arguing that the settlement was a taking of its legal claim against the PRC. The Court of
Claims rejected plaintiffs takings challenge, reasoning, in part, that plaintiff had benefited from normalization of diplomatic relations with China:
[L]ike all other persons in the United States, plaintiff is an incidental beneficiary of the normalization because it may now engage in profitable trade with
the PRC and take advantage of goods imported from the PRC by others.
Plaintiff also shares with other U.S. nationals the benefit of enhanced security
that presumably resulted from normalization of relations.289

Id. at 113.
Id. at 90.
287 4 CI. Ct. 237 (1983). For additional discussions
of this case, see Dagan & White, supra note
139, at 413-14; Levinson, supra note 76, at 1340-41.
288 The facts of the case are set forth at
ShanghaiPower, 4 Cl. Ct. at 239.
289 Id. at 246 & n.16.
285

286
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These are broadly drawn benefits, indeed, and they resulted in denying
compensation altogether for a large power company.
D. Cases of Higher Protectionfor Special Property

Identifying cases consistent with a personality290 theory of property reA takings regime atquires examining the nature of the property taken.
the same regulation
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293 731 So. 2d 508 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
294 Id. at 512.
290 Cf DAGAN,
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demned property. First, the court determined that the property's highest
and best use was as a riverside campsite, despite the fact that the property
had been used exclusively as farmland for over thirty years. The
court
made the questionable finding that campsites have no development
costs
associated with them, and so the Crawfords were permitted to recover
the
full value of the property as if it were already suitable for commercial
use
as
a campground. 2" Next, the court allowed the Crawfords to recover for
the
reduced aesthetic value of their remaining property, and in particular for
the
loss of foliage as a result of the new levee. 96 Finally, the court awarded
both attorneys' fees and the expert appraiser's fees to the Crawfords.297
Taken together, these various awards increased the cost to the government
of its actions and may have even allowed the Crawfords to recover
more
than they ever could have made selling their property on the market.298
Yancey v. United States299 provides an example of a court recharacterizing the nature of the property taken. The Yanceys were owners of a
small
farm for breeding turkeys. After an outbreak of pathogenic Avian
Influenza, the USDA imposed a moratorium on all turkey sales. While
the
agency reimbursed poultry owners who had to slaughter their infected
livestock, the Yancey's turkeys were not actually infected. Nevertheless,
the
quarantine imposed such a financial burden that the Yanceys slaughtered
their birds and sold them as meat, even though the flock was raised as
more
expensive breeder stock."' Economic hardship did not trigger the legal
reimbursement provisions, so the Yanceys sought, and were granted,
compensation for the USDA's regulatory taking. While the turkeys themselves
would not have implicated the Yancey's core personhood interests-there
is
no contention that the 3000 birds were family pets-the Yanceys
were
small farmers in Virginia and the government's taking went to the heart
of
their turkey breeding operation. Although the individual turkeys were
not
deeply personal property, the farm itself was and the government's quarantine threatened its existence.3"1
Id. at 514.
Id. at 5 15 ("The loss of foliage justifies an award of
severance damages.").
297 See id. at 516-17.
298 See also Yaist v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 246,
261 (1989) (awarding replacement value for a
fishing cabin in the Everglades, including the additional costs associated with
"effort and time because
the island [where the cabin was located] is accessible only by small water craft").
Replacement value is
frequently awarded in state courts. See, e.g., Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer
Servs. v. Pompano
Beach, 829 So. 2d 928, 931 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Mass. Port Auth. v.
Sciaba Constr. Corp., 766
N.E.2d 118, 125 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002); State ex reL Dep't of Highways v.
Constant, 369 So. 2d 699
(La. 1979).
299 915 F.2d 1534 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
300 Id. at 1536.
301 Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir.
1992), provides another case of an invasion of
property implicating the plaintiff's core personhood interests. There, Richard
Nixon sued the federal
government for taking his presidential papers after Congress passed the Presidential
Records and Materials Preservation Act. The D.C. Circuit concluded that President Nixon had
suffered a compensable
295

296
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When it came to valuing the turkeys, the court permitted the Yanceys
to recover the full value of the turkeys as breeders, allowing recovery based
on their intended use for the birds instead of the price that a willing buyer
would have paid." 2 There is no evidence the birds themselves were more
valuable as meat than any other turkeys; their increased value came only
from the Yancey's entire breeding operation. The court, therefore, implicitly recharacterized the nature of the taken property, allowing the Yanceys
to recover at least a portion of their subjective harm.
Even Congress has approved a form of super-compensation for takings
of one class of personal property. The pithily named Uniform Relocation
Assistance and Real Property Acquisitions Act of 1970 entitles certain
0
property owners to moving expenses when HUD forces them to relocate."
This, again, puts more than the fair market value of the property at stake
when the government takes people's homes. In this limited circumstance,
at least, Congress has adopted a compensation award consistent with the
personality theory.
CONCLUSION
Looking for consistency in takings cases is a little bit like finding
shapes in the clouds: you can see them if you look hard enough, but they
say more about the observer than the clouds themselves. For every case interpreted in Part III, it would be possible to construct alternative interpretations that would make the court's valuation decision inappropriate under
this Article's normative framework. Instead of a case about a small farm,
for example, Yancey could just as easily be about the government acting in
good faith to preserve the nation's health, in which case recharacterizing the
turkeys as breeding turkeys would have been inappropriate. With so much
doctrinal confusion in the law of takings generally, any attempt to bring order to the chaos is bound to be controversial. At the end of the day, however, the availability of alternative interpretations of each of these cases
taking but only noted in passing the difficult valuation decision involved in the case and remanded to the
district court to make a preliminary determination of damages. See id. at 1287 ("In remanding to the
District Court, we recognize that difficult questions regarding the measure of damages remain. Those
questions, though, were not before this court, and we leave them for the District Court to address in the
first instance."). On remand, the district court rejected the government's arguments that Nixon should
not be entitled to any compensation because the value of his papers had been created by the fact of his
public office, and that the constitution's "Emolument Clause" prohibited compensation. See Griffin v.
United States, 935 F. Supp. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 1995). The court held that the proper measure of valuation was
the fair market value of the papers. While the court saved the actual valuation of the papers for another
day-a day that appears never to have arrived because no further opinions were written in this matterit would have been appropriate for the court to ensure that the fair market value of the papers included a
measure of supercompensation because of the nature of the property taken.
302 See Yancey, 915 F.2d at 1536.
303 42 U.S.C. § 4623 (Supp. 1973). This statute is discussed briefly in Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681,
737 n.195 (1992).
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does not undermine the fundamental purpose Part III is meant to serve:
providing examples of ways in which courts can introduce a measure of
consistency to their compensation analyses.
But why, some might ask, should courts use valuation mechanisms to
achieve substantive goals when the goals themselves remain so contested?
Compensation might seem like a second order concern, and the valuation
mechanism is nothing more than an opportunity for the valuation tail to wag
the takings dog. The purpose of this Article's analysis, however, is not to
suggest that compensation should become a new locus of takings disputes.
Instead, it is to reveal that valuation of takings claims is already deeply contested and entails its own substantive choices. Valuation should work in
tandem with takings law generally so that compensation advances, rather
than interferes with, the substantive values at stake. Applied consistently
with the content of those substantive values, monetary valuation can advance the goals of the Takings Clause. Applied blindly, valuation can undermine substantive constitutional commitments and leave one more area of
takings law desperately in need of coherence.
Courts and commentators have for too long ignored the role of compensation in takings law. As a result, the connection between takings theories and compensation is under-theorized and courts' damage awards are
frequently inconsistent. In fact, compensation in this context has a constitutional dimension that maps directly on to the competing conceptions of the
Takings Clause. The underlying takings debate may not be resolved any
time soon, but understanding the implications of that debate for compensation can lead to more transparent and principled decision-making in the future.
Properly construed, valuation methodologies for regulatory takings
claims reflect more than a disconnected hodgepodge of fact-specific rules.
Instead, they participate in the overarching property theories motivating
various approaches to takings. How courts value takings claims is a central
component in the protection of private property and making sense of those
valuation decisions reveals a new dimension in the otherwise welldeveloped takings scholarship. By examining the critical role of those identified valuation mechanisms in advancing takings theories, this Article has
demonstrated a framework for understanding the meaning of valuation decisions, both in takings law and beyond.

